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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Impact of Charter Schools in Texas.  (August 2006) 
 
Toby Kevin Booker, B.S., Texas A&M University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Timothy J. Gronberg 
 
 
 This dissertation examines the effects of charter schools in Texas, using data from the 
Texas Education Agency for 190 charter schools and over 60,000 charter students.  In Chapter II 
we examine charter effect test score gains for charter students.  After controlling for individual 
student characteristics, we find that students in their first year in a charter school have large 
negative test score gains compared to when they were in traditional public school, and that 
charter schools that have been in operation for more than one year have higher average test score 
gains than new charter schools.  Charter schools appear to have the most positive effects on 
African-American students.  We find that the overall effect of being in a charter school for 
multiple years is that students have slightly lower average test score growth than when they were  
in a traditional public school. 
 In Chapter III we examine the effect of charters on test score gains for students attending 
nearby traditional public schools.  After controlling for campus and student characteristics, we 
find traditional public school districts and campuses that face greater competition from charter 
schools have higher average test score gains than other traditional public schools.  This positive 
effect of charter competition is strongest for African-American and Hispanic students, and is 
focused entirely on students attending traditional public campuses in the bottom 50% of the 
initial campus average achievement distribution. 
 In Chapter IV we examine the charter effect on the distribution of students by ability and 
race/ethnicity, as well as examining what factors are associated with a student choosing to move 
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to a charter school.  We find that students who move to charter schools tend to move to schools 
with a higher percentage of students of their same race/ethnicity, and that this gap is largest for 
African-American students.  We also find that average math and reading test scores are lower 
than the statewide average at the traditional public schools that charter students leave, and that 
charter schools are attracting, on average, the lower-performing students from these low-
performing schools. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
FRL  Free or reduced price lunch 
LEP  Limited English proficient 
NAEP  National Assessment of Educational Progress 
NCLB   No Child Left Behind Act 
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
SAT-9  Stanford Achievement Test Series, 9th edition 
TAAS  Texas Assessment of Academic Skills 
TAKS  Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Over the past decade, charter schools have emerged as one of the primary school choice 
options in the United States.  By 2004, 40 states and the District of Columbia had passed 
legislation authorizing charter schools, and over 3,000 charter schools served over 650,000  
students.  Because the charter sector is such an important and fast-growing provider of school 
choice, the opportunity is ripe to examine the impact of charter schools. 
 Charter school laws vary substantially from state to state, but typically charter schools 
receive most or all of the state per-pupil maintenance and operation funding that a traditional 
public schools would receive.  They are also typically exempt from many state regulations 
concerning curriculum requirements and teacher hiring and compensation.  Many charter schools 
also focus on a specific type of student, such as students that are poor-performing in traditional 
public schools, are in danger of dropping out, or are gifted and talented. 
 There are many interesting policy questions to be addressed regarding the effect of 
charter schools.  Do charter schools have a positive or negative effect on student achievement for 
the students that attend them?  Are charter schools having any effect on the achievement of 
students who remain in traditional public schools?  Which students are choosing to go to charter 
schools, and what are the schools that they leave like?  Do any of these charter school effects 
vary by student ability or demographic characteristics?  To what extent are the effects of charter 
schools a function of the laws governing charter formation and operation? 
 
______________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The American Economic Review. 
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In this dissertation we will attempt to address the issues raised above, using data on 
public school students in Texas.  In doing so, we hope to shed some light on one of the most 
important school choice experiments of the last decade. 
 
CHARTER SCHOOLS IN TEXAS 
 Charter schools in Texas have experienced a rapid expansion since the passage of 
authorizing legislation in 1995.  This growth is due in part to Texas having a relatively 
supportive charter law environment.  In Texas, the primary chartering agency is the State Board 
of Education, which is generally considered to be a more a charter-friendly institutional 
framework than in states where the individual district is the chartering agency.  When a student 
transfers to a charter school in Texas, the charter school receives the full state and local funding 
that the student would have received in the traditional public school, conditioned on their student 
characteristics.  This contrasts with states like Michigan, where only a portion of the state and 
local funding follows the student to a charter school.  Additionally, charter schools have more 
flexibility than traditional public schools in terms of curriculum requirements, hiring and 
compensating teachers, and in targeting specific groups of students. 
 Table 1.1 shows the pattern of charter school growth between 1996-97 and 2003-04.  
There were 16 charter schools in Texas in 1996-97, the first year of charter operation.  This grew 
to 61 charters in 1998-99, 142 in 1999-00, and by 2003-04 there were 190 charter schools 
operating in Texas, with a total enrollment of 60,748 students.  By 2003-04, 1.41 percent of 
Texas public school students were attending charter schools. 
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Table 1.1—Number and Enrollment of Charter Schools in Texas 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Number of 
Charters in 
Operation 
 
Total 
Enrollment 
in Charters 
Annual 
Charter 
Enrollment 
Growth 
Percent of 
Public 
Students in 
Charters 
2003-04 190 60,748 14% 1.41 
2002-03 185 53,156 13% 1.25 
2001-02 180 46,979 24% 1.13 
2000-01 159 37,978 44% 0.94 
1999-00 142 25,687 110% 0.64 
1998-99 61 12,226 217% 0.31 
1997-98 19 3,856 60% 0.10 
1996-97 16 2,412 - 0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2—Charter Industry Growth 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Increase in Number 
of Charter Students 
from Previous Year 
Number 
of New 
Charter 
Schools 
Number of 
Students 
Attending New 
Charter Schools 
Percent Growth 
in Charters Due 
to Entry of New 
Charter Schools 
 
Number of 
Exiting Charter 
Schools 
2003-04 7,592 9 1,165 15.3% 4 
2002-03 6,177 10 1,121 18.1% 5 
2001-02 9,983 23 2,926 32.5% 2 
2000-01 12,269 21 2,686 21.9% 4 
1999-00 13,461 83 11,770 87.4% 2 
1998-99 8,370 42 6,705 80.1% 0 
1997-98 1,444 3 364 25.2% 0 
1996-97 2,412 16 2,412 100% - 
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Table 1.2 shows the path of charter industry growth in Texas, with the most new  
charter schools opening for the 1998-99 school year (42) and the 1999-00 school year (83).  
Although the number of students enrolled in charter schools has continued to grow through 
2003-04, starting in 2000-01 most of the growth was due to expansion of existing charter 
schools, rather than the entry of new charters.  Note that we see 17 charter schools closed during 
this time period. 
 One interesting characteristic of Texas charter school legislation is that from 1998 
through 2000 there was a cap on the total number of open enrollment charters granted, but 
charter schools that committed to serve at least 75% At-risk1 students were exempted from this 
cap.  This incentive structure had an effect, as over half the new charter schools that opened 
during this time period were of the At-risk type.  This may also contribute to the fact that 
students we observe in charter schools tend to have substantially lower test scores on average 
than the statewide student population, with the difference being larger than is typically seen in 
other states with charter schools. 
                                                                
1
 A student may be classified as At-risk for a variety of reasons, including failure to advance from one grade level to 
the next, failure of two or more classes, and failure of a section of the TAAS or TAKS exam, as well as reasons having 
to do with personal circumstances such as being pregnant. 
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Table 1.3—Student Demographics in Charters and Traditional Publics, 2003-04  
 
 
 
 
 
Student Characteristic 
 
 
 
 
Charter 
Students 
 
 
 
Traditional 
Public 
Students 
Traditional 
Public 
Students in 
Districts 
with Charter 
Schools 
Percent White 18.4 39.0 26.4 
Percent African-American 39.0 13.9 17.7 
Percent Hispanic 40.9 43.8 52.9 
Percent Asian 1.4 3.0 2.7 
Percent Native American 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Percent FRL eligible 63.1 52.7 61.5 
Percent limited English 
proficient 
9.1 15.4 20.1 
Percent in special education 11.3 11.6 11.2 
Percent in career and 
technology 
15.8 20.2 19.6 
Percent gifted and talented 1.0 7.9 8.5 
Percent Classified as At-risk 51.7 37.7 41.1 
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Table 1.3 compares the average demographics in 2003-04 for students in charter schools, 
in traditional public schools, and in traditional public school districts that contain at least one 
charter school within their geographic boundaries.  Comparing charter school students to 
students in traditional public schools, charter school students are more likely to be African-
American, eligible for free or reduced price lunch, and classified as At-risk, while students in 
traditional public schools are more likely to be white, limited English proficient, gifted and 
talented, and in career and technology programs.  If we instead compare charter school students 
to students in public school districts that contain at least one charter school, these public districts 
also have a higher percentage of Hispanic students than charter schools, and almost as high a 
percentage of FRL eligible students as charter schools. 
Charter schools in Texas are concentrated primarily in a few large urban school districts.  
Over 60% of the states’ charter schools are located in the five largest metropolitan areas: 
Houston, Dallas and Fort Worth, El Paso, San Antonio, and Austin, which in total contain about 
half the population of Texas. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 There is a relatively large literature on the effects of attending a charter school on 
student achievement.  Unfortunately, much of the existing literature lacks adequate controls for 
the differences in student characteristics between charter students and students in traditional 
public schools.  However, there have been some recent papers that use longitudinally-matched 
student-level data to evaluate the achievement effects of charter schools. 
 Solmon, Paark, and Garcia (2001) look at the achievement of charter students and 
traditional public school students in Arizona between 1998 and 2000, using SAT-9 test scores.  
Their sample includes 8,000 students observed in a charter school during their three years of 
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data, as well as 32,000 students in traditional public schools.  They include student fixed effects 
in their model to control for differences in time-invariant student characteristics between charter 
schools and traditional public schools.  They find that students who attend charter schools for 
more than one year have significantly higher achievement on both reading and math than 
students in traditional public schools.  However, they do not include a measure of how long the 
charter school has been in operation, so this is solely the effect of student experience in a charter, 
without controlling for charter tenure. 
 Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) look at student achievement for students in grades 4 
through 7 in Texas, between 1996 and 2001.  Their sample includes 6,600 charter students and 
over 800,000 traditional public school students.  They evaluate the effect of charter schools 
student test score gains on the TAAS state assessment test, and include individual student fixed 
effects, as well as controls for student mobility.  They include separate effects for charter schools 
depending on how long the charter has been in operation. 
 Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin find that student test score gains are lower in both reading 
and math at charter schools that are in their first year of operation, compared to student test score 
gains in traditional public schools.  They find that as the charters mature the negative effects go 
away, so that charter schools in their third year or more of operation have student test score gains 
comparable to those in traditional public schools.  They do not include a separate effect for a 
student being in their first year in a charter, so it is difficult to tell how much of the difference in 
charter effects for charters with different tenures is due to the different average student years 
spent in a charter for the different categories. 
 Booker et al. (2004a) look at the effect of charter schools on student test scores in Texas, 
using a similar methodology to Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, but with student data on students 
through 2001-02.  Their sample contains over 10,000 charter students, and over 1.4 million 
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traditional public school students.  They add separate controls for a student being in their first 
year in a charter school, as well as for a student being in their first year back in a traditional 
public school after attending a charter.  They find that the effect of being a first-year charter 
student is large and negative, and that once this is controlled for first-year charter schools are not 
significantly different on test score gains relative to traditional public schools.  They also find 
that as charters increase in tenure their performance improves, with charters in operation for 
more than one year having higher math and reading gains than traditional public schools. 
 Sass (2006) applies the student fixed effects methodology to examining student 
achievement in Florida charter schools.  He uses data on Florida public school students in grades 
3 through 10 in years 1999 through 2003.  His sample contains over 28,000 students that 
attended a charter school, and over a million traditional public school students.  He uses two 
primary models for estimating student achievement effects, one with student test score gains as 
the dependent variable, the other with student test score levels as the dependent variable and the 
lagged test score included in the model.  He finds that new charter schools perform more poorly 
than traditional public schools, but by their fifth year in operation charter schools have caught up 
to traditional public schools in math scores, and in reading charter schools in operation for five 
years have slightly higher average test score gains than traditional public schools. 
 Bifulco and Ladd (2006) use a similar student fixed effects methodology to examine 
charter school achievement effects in North Carolina.  They track students in grades 3 through 8 
for the years 1996 through 2002.  Their sample includes 8,700 charter students and almost 
500,000 traditional public school students.  Like Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, they do not 
distinguish between the effect of moving to a charter and the effect of a traditional public 
district-to-district move.  Similarly, they find that new charter schools perform most poorly, and 
that as charter schools become more experienced they improve their performance.  However, 
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they find that even mature charter schools have lower average student achievement gains than 
traditional public schools. 
 There are several recent papers looking at the effects of charter schools on the 
achievement of students in surrounding public schools.  Among the papers using cross-sectional 
data to perform school-level analyses of this issue are Holmes, DeSimone, and Rupp (2003), 
Eberts and Hollenbeck (2001), Greene and Forster (2002), and Bettinger (1999).  These papers 
generally find mixed results, with some studies finding positive competition effects, while others 
find no effect or a negative effect of charter competition on traditional public schools.  Hoxby 
(2003) is a good example of this literature.  She compares traditional public school achievement 
in Arizona and Michigan before and after the school districts face charter competition, where 
facing charter competition is defined as having at least six percent of the students within a 
geographic district attending charter schools.  She finds that greater charter competition is 
associated with higher average campus fourth grade reading and math achievement levels. 
 Booker et al. (2004b) use a student panel data set in Texas to look at the effects of 
charter competition on public school students in grades 4 through 8 from 1996 through 2002.  
They use a campus-student spell fixed effects model to control for persistent variation in campus 
and student ability and demographics, with student math or reading test score gains as the 
outcomes measure.  They measure charter competition as either the percent of students in a 
district attending charter schools, or as the number of charter schools within an N-mile radius of 
the public campus.  They find a positive effect of charter competition on both reading and math 
scores, and find that this effect is concentrated entirely in the 40% of public campuses with the 
lowest initial average test score levels. 
 Holmes (2003) uses cross-sectional student data linked over time for public school 
students in North Carolina, with controls for student demographic characteristics.  He finds that 
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having a charter within 6 miles of the traditional public school has a positive effect on student 
math scores but not reading scores, and that having a charter within 12 miles has a positive effect 
on student reading scores but not math scores. 
 Bifulco and Ladd (2006) employ a student panel data set to look at competitive effects in 
North Carolina, using student fixed effects to control for differences in student ability and 
demographics.  They find no significant competitive effects of charters on reading or math score 
gains in traditional public schools, where charter competition is measured by an indicator for 
whether there is a charter school within a 2.5, 5, or 10-mile radius of the public campus. 
 Sass (2006) employs a similar methodology to look for competitive effects in Florida 
public schools, employing campus-student spell fixed effects to control for both campus and 
student time-invariant characteristics.  He measures charter competition by either the number of 
charter schools within an N-mile radius of the public campus, or an indicator for the existence of 
a charter school within an N-mile radius.  He finds small but significant positive effects of 
charter competition on both reading and math score gains. 
 The literature examining the distributional effects of charter schools is relatively small.  
Two papers that have started to examine this issue using longitudinally-matched student panel 
data are Bifulco and Ladd (2004), which examines distributional effects of charter schools in 
North Carolina, and Booker, Zimmer, and Buddin (2005), which examines distributional effects 
of charters in California and Texas.  Bifulco and Ladd find that African-American charter 
movers in North Carolina tend to move to charter schools with a higher percentage of African-
American students than the public schools that they left, and that a similar pattern holds for 
white students.  They also find that the African-American students that move to more segregated 
charter schools have substantially lower achievement effects from charter attendance than other 
charter students. 
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Booker, Zimmer, and Buddin find that students who move to charter schools in both 
California and Texas tend to move to charter schools that are more like them demographically 
than the public school they left, and that this difference is most pronounced for African-
American charter movers.  They also find that in Texas charter schools are attracting students 
from the lowest-performing public campuses, and that the students from these low-performing 
campuses that move to charter schools tend to be on average the lowest-performing students at 
those campuses.  
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The data set used throughout this dissertation consists of data for the Texas public school 
system from 1993-94 through 2003-04.  All data was obtained from the Texas Education 
Agency.  The data consist of student-level, campus-level, and district-level data sets.  The 
student-level data contain observations for all students in Texas public schools between grades 3 
and 8, and years 1993-94 through 2003-04.  This includes student demographic and program 
participation information, such as gender, race/ethnicity, FRL status, LEP status, whether the 
student is in special education, and the student is classified as At-risk. 
 For each student we have math and reading scores on the statewide standardized test.  
For 1993-94 through 2001-02 the test is the TAAS test.  Starting in 2002-03 the state switched to 
the TAKS test.  Both the TAAS and TAKS tests are administered in the spring to all Texas 
public school students in grades 3-8 and 10 (3-11 for the TAKS test), although some limited 
English proficient and special education students are exempt.  Approximately 15% of students in 
the relevant grades do not take the test because they are either exempt or absent on the testing 
days.  The tests are criterion referenced, with a certain passing standard required to pass the test. 
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Because we compare student scores across this switch in testing regimes, we must 
standardize the test scores to make them comparable.  We standardize the reading and math 
scores using rank-based Z-scores, which fit the statewide student score distributions onto a 
standard normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of one, by grade, year, and test, 
ensuring comparability over time and across different testing regimes.2 
 Each student in the data has a unique student identifier, which can be used to follow 
individual students over time as they change schools.  We also have campus-level and district-
level data with enrollments, demographic percentages, and average passing rates for each year. 
 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
 The research approach in the following three chapters is to divide up the issues related to 
the effects of charter schools into three different categories.  The first category is the effect of 
attending a charter school on student achievement, which is addressed in Chapter II.  The second 
category is the effect of competition from charter schools on the performance of students in 
traditional public schools, which is addressed in Chapter III.  The third category is the effect of 
charter schools on the distribution of students by race/ethnicity and ability, as well as analyzing 
which student characteristics are associated with having a high probability of moving to a charter 
school, and applying this to extensions of the models from Chapters II and III.  This third 
category is addressed in Chapter IV. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
2
 The rank-based Z-scores are calculated by ranking each student in the statewide test distribution for that subject, 
grade, and year, normalizing this ranking to range from 0 to 1 across students, then calculating the rank-based Z-score 
as the inverse cumulative density function of this normalized ranking. 
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CHAPTER II 
CHARTER ACHIEVEMENT EFFECTS 
 
 
 One of the primary policy debates in the charter school literature is over whether charter 
schools are effective at improving the academic performance of students.  Studies such as the 
2003 National Assessment of Educational Progress have received considerable publicity, and 
have been used by charter school critics as evidence that charter schools are performing poorly.  
The NAEP results indicate that average score levels are lower at charter schools than at 
traditional public schools, for almost every racial, geographic, and income category. 
 Analyses such as the NAEP study, which compare average test score levels across 
sectors in a single year, are not useful for evaluating the performance of charter schools.  
Students who choose to attend charter schools have average characteristics that are quite 
different from the general student population.  Failure to control for these student population 
differences yields a misleading picture of the quality of schools across the two sectors, which 
should be the primary policy interest.  A valid comparison of student achievement in charter 
schools and traditional public schools must control for the differences in non-school inputs 
(student ability, family involvement, peer ability), as well as for the non-random selection of 
students into charter schools. 
 Recent papers by Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002), Bifulco and Ladd (2006), Sass 
(2006), and Booker et al. (2004a) provide a more careful comparison of student performance in 
charter schools and traditional public schools.  These papers use a longitudinally-matched panel 
data on student math and reading test scores to estimate models that compare student test score 
growth in both sectors, using student fixed effects to control for time-invariant student 
characteristics. 
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 Two other key issues must be addressed when evaluating student performance in charter 
schools.  One is that the charter school sector is still relatively new, and many charter schools 
have only been in operation for a short time.  Startup costs for charters could be significant, and 
it is likely that charter schools in their first or second year of operation could have different 
average quality than charter schools that are well-established.  Separating the effect of charter 
school attendance on student achievement by the tenure of the charter is important in order to 
better evaluate the long-run success of the charter school industry. 
 The second key issue to be addressed as the charter industry expands is the large 
percentage of observed charter student observations that are for students in their first year in a 
charter school.  Switching schools in general can have a disruption effect that lowers student 
performance in the year after the move, and if a charter school is a significantly different 
environment than a traditional public school then it is likely that a move to a charter school 
would have an even greater disruption effect.3  While the mover effect is an important 
component of the overall picture of student achievement in charter schools, failure to control for 
first-year charter student  effects could mask other interesting aspects of overall student 
performance in charter schools.  In this chapter the goal is to provide a more complete 
assessment of  the effect of attending a charter school on student achievement by looking at the 
performance path of students as they enter charter schools and either continue in a charter or 
transfer to back to a traditional public school.  
 
                                                                
3
 See Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) for a more detailed discussion of the disruption effect of switching schools. 
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CHARTER STUDENTS IN TEXAS 
 Since the first charter school was established in Texas in 1996, the charter school 
industry in Texas has expanded rapidly.  One important characteristic of the charter laws in 
Texas is that, from 1998 through 2000, some charter schools were chartered specifically to serve 
primarily students who were academically At-risk.  There was no cap on the number of these At-
risk charter schools, as there was for other open enrollment charters.  During this time period, 
over half of the new charter schools that opened were of the At-risk type. 
 Table 1.3 compares the average characteristics of students in charter schools and in 
traditional public schools in Texas.  Charter students in Texas are more likely than students in 
traditional public schools to be African-American, eligible for free or reduced price lunch, and 
At-risk, and less likely to be white or limited English proficient.  This holds even when we 
compare charter students to students in public districts with at least one charter school, which is 
the last column of the table. 
 Table 2.1 shows how the Texas charter school industry has expanded over time.  The 
largest growth came in 1998-99, with 42 new charter schools, and in 1999-00, with 83 new 
charter schools.  Even through 2003-04, there is still considerable entry by new charter schools.  
However, we do not see much evidence that charters school are exiting the market in large 
numbers.  We see relatively few observations on charter schools beyond their sixth year of 
operation, with only 18 charter-year observations for seventh-year charters, and only 15 charter-
year observations for eighth-year charters, which will limit our ability to distinguish the effect of 
being in operation for those final two years. 
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Table 2.1—Distribution of Charter Schools by Years of Operation in Each Year 
Years in 
Operation 
 
1996-97 
 
1997-98 
 
1998-99 
 
1999-00 
 
2000-01 
 
2001-02 
 
2002-03 
 
2003-04 
1 16 3 42 83 20 23 10 9 
2 - 16 3 40 80 18 23 10 
3 - - 16 3 40 80 18 23 
4 - - - 16 3 40 77 18 
5 - - - - 15 3 39 74 
6 - - - - - 15 3 38 
7 - - - - - - 15 3 
8 - - - - - - - 15 
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MODEL 
 We follow the general approach for modeling an educational production function from 
Todd and Wolpin (2003).  Their starting point is a general cumulative model of student 
achievement: 
(1) [ ]itiiiit tStFA εµ ,),(),(=  
where Ait is the achievement level of student i in year t, Fit is a vector of family inputs in year t, 
Sit is a vector of school inputs in year t, µi is a student fixed effect representing innate student 
ability, and εit is the measurement error term. 
 If we assume that Ait does not vary over time and is additively separable, we can rewrite 
the education production function as: 
(2) 
ititititit
itititit
SSS
FFFA
εµγβββ
ααα
++++++
+++=
−
−
1121
1121
...
...
 
where αi and βi represent the weights given to year i’s inputs. 
 Equation 2 is impossible to estimate with our data, as it requires data on all prior family 
and school inputs.  We can assume that family inputs are time-invariant and captured by the 
student fixed effect µi.  This implies the assumption that family inputs are uncorrelated with 
school inputs.  Additionally, we can assume that school inputs have an immediate effect on 
achievement that does not decay over time.  This yields the following equation: 
(3) itiitititit SAAA εµβ ++=∆=− − 11  
This is the baseline equation used in our estimation, where the students test score gains ∆Ait are a 
function of current school inputs and a student fixed effect that controls for time-invariant 
student and family characteristics.4  This is the same specification used in Hanushek, Kain, and 
                                                                
4
 See Todd and Wolpin (2003) for additional details and alternative specifications of the education production 
function. 
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Rivkin (2002), Bifulco and Ladd (2006), Sass (2006), and Booker et al. (2004a), so the results 
will be comparable to other findings in the literature. 
 An alternative specification, which is also included in Sass (2006), is to use the student’s 
current score as the dependent variable, include the lagged score as an explanatory variable and 
instrumenting for the lagged score with the twice-lagged score.  This alternative functional form 
assumes that school inputs decay at a constant rate over time, instead of not decaying at all.  We 
choose to use the specification with test scores gains as the dependent variable for three reasons.  
First, it allows us to include an additional grade of students in our estimation sample, as we only 
need one lagged score per student rather than also using a twice-lagged score.  Second, the gains 
model is easily interpretable as the effect of treatment on the students test score gains, whereas 
the alternative model is a hybrid of the effect on levels and on gains, which makes interpreting 
the resulting treatment effects more difficult.   Third, the gains model is more widely used in the 
literature, so using it makes our results more widely comparable with the findings of other 
researchers. 
 As our measure of Ait, we use the student’s standardized test score in reading or math.5  
In the models that include a student fixed effect we also include as time-varying characteristics 
the student’s mover status (separately for different types of student moves), whether the student 
is in special education, and the campus percent African-American and percent Hispanic, as well 
as grade-by-year indicators. 
 We use this model to look at the effect of attending a charter school on student 
performance.  Because of the inclusion of a student fixed effect, any treatment that is time-
invariant over the time that we observe the student is captured by the student fixed effect.  This 
means that the only students that are contributing to our estimated charter school effect are those 
                                                                
5
 The standardized scores are rank-based Z-scores constructed from the full student data, as described in Chapter I. 
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that we observe in both a charter school and a traditional public school in our data set (between 
grades 3 and 8, years 1994-95 through 2003-04)).  In Chapter IV we perform a more detailed 
analysis of exactly which students are observed transferring, and it ends up being a little over 
half of the total observed charter students in these grades.  We also check to see if the students 
that we observe transferring are observationally similar to those that we never observe in public 
schools, and the two groups are similar in composition.  Still, care must be taken in generalizing 
these results to the entire charter school population, as they are based solely off of students who 
move to or from charter schools in grades 3 through 8. 
 Because the treatment effects we observe occur at the campus level, the standard errors 
in all of our regressions are adjusted for clustering of students by campus. 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The data set used in this chapter is a subset of the full student data set described in 
Chapter I, with data on Texas students in grades 3-8 from 1993-94 through 2003-04.  All the 
data was obtained from the Texas Education Agency.  The data include student math and reading 
test scores for every tested student in the state of Texas on either the TAAS test (through 2001-
02) or the TAKS test (2002-03 and 2003-04), both statewide standardized achievement tests.6  
The data also include student demographic indicators, including race/ethnicity, gender, free or 
reduced price lunch eligibility, limited English proficiency, special education status, and whether 
the student is classified as At-risk.  The data include a unique student identifier which can be 
used to track individual students over time as they move between charter schools and traditional 
public schools.  Also included are campus-level and district-level data sets with campus and 
district demographic data. 
                                                                
6
 Due to confidentiality concerns, the data on student characteristics such as ethnicity are masked if there are fewer 
than five students in a cell in a single grade at a campus. 
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 Because the full sample of students in Texas over this time period is too large to make 
estimation using the full sample computationally tractable, we randomly sampled a smaller 
group of students for our estimation sample.  Fortunately, the only students who contribute 
directly to the charter achievement effect are students that are observed in charter schools in our 
data, which is a small fraction of the total student population.  We kept every student who is 
observed in a charter school between 1996-97 and 2003-04 in grades 3-8, then took a random 
10% sample of all remaining students.7  All of the regressions are weighted to account for this 
differential sampling probability.8 
 Because we are comparing test scores across different testing regimes with differently-
shaped student test score distributions, it is important to standardize the scores so that they are 
comparable over time.  We use rank-based Z-score to standardize the scores, which fit the 
statewide student score distributions onto a normal distribution by grade, year, and test, ensuring 
comparability over time and across different testing regimes. 
 Table 2.2 has the summary statistics for the student sample used in the regressions 
looking at the effect of charter school attendance on student achievement gains.  The first 
column has the means for the entire estimation sample, the second column for students that we 
observe in a charter school, and the third column for students that we never observe in a charter 
school. 
                                                                
7
 The sampling was done at the student level, so when a student is kept we keep every student-year observation for 
that student. 
8
 The weight is the inverse of the probability that the student was chosen for our sample. 
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Table 2.2—Summary Statistics for Chapter II Estimation Sample 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Overall 
Sample 
Mean 
Mean for 
Students 
Observed in 
a Charter 
School 
Mean for 
Students Not 
Observed in 
a Charter 
School 
Number of student-year observations 1,256,983 81,254 1,175,729 
Number of unique students 514,632 38,668 475,964 
    
In a 1st year charter .003 .047 - 
In a 2nd or 3rd year charter .010 .150 - 
In a 4th through 8th year charter .010 .158 - 
    
Female .505 .504 .505 
African-American .156 .372 .141 
Hispanic .371 .400 .369 
FRL Eligible .459 .609 .449 
Limited English proficient .055 .058 .055 
Special education .056 .037 .057 
    
Public district mover .068 .059 .068 
Public campus mover .282 .160 .290 
Public-to-charter mover .010 .158 - 
Charter-to-public mover .006 .092 - 
Charter-to-charter mover .001 .012 - 
    
Standardized Math score -.016 
(.981) 
-.448 
(1.01) 
.014 
(.972) 
Standardized Reading score -.006 
(.969) 
-.347 
(.988) 
.018 
(.964) 
Change in Math score -.004 
(.678) 
-.012 
(.768) 
-.004 
(.671) 
Change in Reading score .001 
(.707) 
-.002 
(.763) 
.001 
(.703) 
    
Campus percent African-American .152 .311 .142 
Campus percent Hispanic .386 .433 .383 
 
Notes: Standard deviations for non-binary variables shown in parenthesis.
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 Comparing the last two columns, we can see that students we observe in a charter school 
are more likely to be African-American and FRL eligible than students we don’t observe in a 
charter school, are slightly more likely to be Hispanic, and slightly less likely to be in special 
education.  Also, students that we observe in charter schools have much lower average 
standardized math and reading scores than other students, and slightly lower average math and 
reading score gains.  Charter students also tend to be in campuses that have a higher percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic than students who are not observed in charter schools. 
 
RESULTS 
 Table 2.3 presents the baseline results for the effect of charter attendance on math and 
reading test score gains.  The first column for each subject shows the results for the OLS 
specification with no fixed effects, the second column shows the results with campus fixed 
effects included in the model, and the third column shows the results with student fixed effects 
included in the model, which is the baseline specification used for the rest of this chapter.  The 
effect of attending a charter school is split up depending on how many years the charter has been 
in operation, with separate effects for attending a charter in its first year of operation, second or 
third year of operation, or fourth year of operation and higher. 
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Table 2.3—Estimated Effect of Charter Attendance on Math and Reading Gains 
  Math   Reading  
 
 
Variable 
 
No Fixed 
Effects 
Campus 
Fixed 
Effects 
Student 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
No Fixed 
Effects 
Campus 
Fixed 
Effects 
Student 
Fixed 
Effects 
1st  year charter -.011 
(.036) 
-.011 
(.124) 
-.041 
(.045) 
.015 
(.031) 
.028 
(.108) 
.006 
(.031) 
2nd or 3rd year 
charter 
.070 
(.025) 
.013 
(.116) 
.067 
(.034) 
.044 
(.019) 
.064 
(.106) 
.045 
(.025) 
4th through 8th year 
charter 
.029 
(.019) 
.078 
(.122) 
.024 
(.035) 
.041 
(.013) 
.075 
(.107) 
.040 
(.026) 
       
District mover -.042 
(.004) 
-.027 
(.003) 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.028 
(.003) 
-.018 
(.003) 
-.024 
(.005) 
Campus mover -.131 
(.004) 
-.082 
(.004) 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.095 
(.003) 
-.060 
(.003) 
-.105 
(.004) 
Moved to charter 
from public 
-.256 
(.014) 
-.226 
(.036) 
-.236 
(.041) 
-.191 
(.021) 
-.170 
(.025) 
-.184 
(.029) 
Moved to public 
from charter 
.236 
(.014) 
.256 
(.014) 
.239 
(.020) 
.157 
(.012) 
.167 
(.012) 
.171 
(.017) 
Moved from one 
charter to another 
-.016 
(.037) 
-.016 
(.045) 
-.032 
(.042) 
-.008 
(.038) 
.031 
(.036) 
-.007 
(.038) 
       
Student in special 
education 
-.009 
(.003) 
-.008 
(.003) 
.022 
(.008) 
-.001 
(.003) 
.000 
(.003) 
.020 
(.008) 
Student is African-
American 
-.005 
(.002) 
-.007 
(.002) 
- -.013 
(.002) 
-.015 
(.002) 
- 
Student is Hispanic -.009 
(.002) 
-.008 
(.002) 
- -.012 
(.002) 
-.012 
(.002) 
- 
Student is FRL 
eligible 
-.008 
(.002) 
-.007 
(.001) 
- -.012 
(.002) 
-.010 
(.002) 
- 
Student is limited 
English proficient 
.082 
(.004) 
.083 
(.003) 
- .111 
(.004) 
.113 
(.004) 
- 
Campus percent 
African-American 
-.031 
(.009) 
- .079 
(.018) 
.014 
(.007) 
- .098 
(.015) 
Campus percent 
Hispanic 
-.017 
(.005) 
- .118 
(.014) 
.011 
(.004) 
- .092 
(.012) 
       
Sample size 1,218,376 1,219,923 1,256,983 1,210,829 1,212,363 1,249,135 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects. 
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 The regressions include a full set of student mover indicators, including indicators for 
public-to-public district and campus moves, public-to-charter moves, charter-to-public moves, 
and charter-to-charter moves.9  This means that the estimated effects of attending a charter 
school are after controlling for the effect of being a first-year charter student.  This first-year 
charter student effect (captured by the public-to-charter mover indicator) is generally negative 
and larger than the effect of making an public-to-public campus move.  The corresponding 
coefficient on moving from a charter back to a public is typically positive and significant. 
 The regressions also include as explanatory variables the percent African-American and 
percent Hispanic at the campus, as well as an indicator for the student being in special 
education.10  In the specifications without student fixed effects we include additional student 
demographic indicators, including indicators for the student being African-American, Hispanic, 
free or reduced price lunch eligible, or limited English proficient. 
 The estimates effect of charter attendance is fairly stable across the different 
specifications, and across both math and reading.  The first-year charter effect is insignificant 
throughout, with a small negative coefficient for math and a small positive coefficient for 
reading.  The second or third-year charter effect and the fourth-year and higher effect are 
consistently positive.  For the student fixed effects specification, the coefficient on the second or 
third-year charter indicator is .067 in math (significant at the 5% level) and .045 in reading 
(significant at the 10% level), indicating that students who are not in their first year in a charter 
that attend charter schools that are in their second or third year of operation have annual math 
score gains that are .067 higher than they would have had in a traditional public school, where 
                                                                
9
 A public-to-public district mover is defined as a student who moved from one traditional public district to another.  
A public-to-public campus mover is defined as a student who moved from one traditional public campus to another 
but did not change districts.  This includes both structural movers, students who switch from elementary to middle 
school, and non-structural movers, with the vast majority of the public-to-public campus movers being structural 
movers. 
10
 Other student characteristics do not vary significantly over time, and are omitted due to the inclusion of student 
fixed effects. 
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the effect is measured in standard deviations of the score level.  Similarly, reading score gains 
are .045 higher at second or third-year charters than for traditional public school students. 
 The estimated effect on student score gains of attending a charter school in its fourth 
year or more of operation is .020 in math and .040 in reading for the student fixed effects 
specification, with neither coefficient significant at the 10% level.  Although there is a large 
estimated effect associated with even public-to-public campus moves11, -.148 in math and -.105 
in reading, the negative effect associated with moving from a public to a charter is substantially 
larger, -.236 in math and -.184 in reading.  When interpreting the overall effect of charter 
attendance, this negative first-year charter student effect must be included as well.  Because 
almost every student at a first-year charter school is a first-year charter student, the overall effect 
of being a first-year student at a first-year charter is negative, even though the coefficient on the 
first-year charter indicator is small, because of the predominance of the negative public-to-
charter mover effect. 
 Correspondingly, there is a significant positive effect associated with moving from a 
charter to a traditional public school.  In the student fixed effects specification this effect is .239 
in math and .171 in reading, indicating that former charter students have substantially larger test 
score gains during their first year after moving back to a traditional public school.  This positive 
charter-to-public mover effect is almost equal in magnitude to the negative public-to-charter 
effect, and is likely due in part to a rebound effect from students who found charter schools to be  
a poor match. 
                                                                
11
 Almost all of these public-to-public campus movers are structural movers switching between elementary and middle 
school, so this negative campus mover effect could be partially explained as a negative effect of a student’s first year 
in a middle school. 
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Table 2.4—Charter Attendance Effects, Alternate Specifications 
  
Separate Effects for Each 
Year of Charter Tenure 
Without Separate Effects 
for Moving to or from a 
Charter 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
1st  year charter 
 
-.045 
(.046) 
-.005 
(.031) 
-.296 
(.047) 
-.194 
(.038) 
2nd or 3rd year 
charter 
- - -.116 
(.034) 
-.097 
(.023) 
4th through 8th year 
charter 
- - -.129 
(.029) 
-.079 
(.020) 
2nd year charter 
 
.049 
(.033) 
-.001 
(.026) 
- - 
3rd year charter 
 
.080 
(.045) 
.076 
(.034) 
- - 
4th year charter 
 
.028 
(.046) 
.034 
(.032) 
- - 
5th year charter 
 
-.018 
(.053) 
.019 
(.036) 
- - 
6th year charter 
 
.098 
(.078) 
.096 
(.052) 
- - 
7th year charter 
 
-.068 
(.094) 
.099 
(.085) 
- - 
8th year charter 
 
.292 
(.131) 
.131 
(.083) 
- - 
     
District mover 
 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
-.037 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
Campus mover 
 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
Moved to charter 
from public 
-.234 
(.040) 
-.178 
(.029) 
- - 
Moved to public 
from charter 
.238 
(.020) 
.169 
(.017) 
- - 
Moved from one 
charter to another 
-.036 
(.042) 
-.008 
(.038) 
- - 
     
Sample size 1,256,983 1,249,135 1,256,983 1,249,135 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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 Table 2.4 shows results for two alternate specifications.   The first alternate specification 
allows the charter effect to be different in every year of charter tenure.  Here again we see that 
after their first year of operation the charter school effect seems to be generally positive, 
although the coefficients are rarely significant.  There also appears to be weak evidence of an 
upward trend, with the effect on student gains improving with charter tenure, particularly in 
reading, which is consistent with the findings of other researchers looking at achievement in 
charter schools. 
 The second alternate specification in Table 2.4 treats moves to and from a charter school 
as normal district moves, rather than having a separate indicator for each type of charter move.  
Because the negative effect of a public-to-public district move is much smaller than the negative 
public-to-charter move effect, treating the two as equivalent shifts most of the negative first year 
charter student effect onto the first-year, second or third-year, and fourth-year and higher charter 
effects.  In this specification first-year charters, which have almost entirely first-year charter 
students, have large negative effects on student test score gains, -.296 in math and -.194 in 
reading.  Even for more experienced charters there is still a significant negative effect, -.129 in 
math and -.079 in reading for charters with four or more years of experience. 
 The difference between the charter effects in these two different specifications highlights 
the importance of how the negative first-year charter student effect is handled.  Even in well-
established charter schools, a substantial portion of their students in any given year are first-year 
charter students, and their negative test score gains cause all of the charter effects to be lower if 
unaccounted for.  However, the inclusion of a separate indicator for public-to-charter movers in 
the baseline specification does not mean that those students’ performance should be ignored 
when evaluating charter performance as a whole.  Students tend to have negative test score gains 
in their first year in a charter, whether because it is a more disruptive move than a traditional 
28 
public-to-public mover, or because charter schools don’t do as well with first-year students, and 
in an expanding industry a large portion of our charter observations are of first-year students.  
We have chosen generally to separate the first-year charter student effect from the overall effect 
of charter attendance, but the effect is certainly an important component of the overall effect of 
charter schools on student performance. 
 One possible explanation for the negative public-to-charter mover effect, and the 
positive charter-to-public mover effect, is that some students try out charter schools and quickly 
realize that they are a poor match, and these students then recover quickly once they return to 
traditional public schools.  Table 2.5 takes the baseline specification and allows the effect of 
moving to and from a charter to vary depending on how long we observe the student remaining 
in a charter in our data.  Not only is the effect of moving to a charter significantly negative for all 
students, the math effect is actually slightly larger for students who ended up remaining in 
charter schools at least three years (-.278) than for students who remained in charter school only 
one year (-.182).  In reading the effect is negative and of approximately the same magnitude for 
each student group.  This would indicate that the negative first-year charter student effect is not 
attributable mainly to students who stay in a charter for only one year. 
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Table 2.5—Charter Attendance Effects, With Separate Charter Mover Effects by Total Years the 
Student Spends in a Charter 
Variable Math Reading 
1st  year charter 
 
-.073 
(.045) 
-.011 
(.032) 
2nd or 3rd year charter 
 
.033 
(.033) 
.029 
(.024) 
4th through 8th year charter 
 
-.015 
(.033) 
.024 
(.025) 
   
District mover 
 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
Campus mover 
 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
Moved to charter (and 
remained one year) 
-.182 
(.035) 
-.170 
(.028) 
Moved to charter (and 
remained two years) 
-.216 
(.049) 
-.159 
(.034) 
Moved to charter (and 
remained at least three years) 
-.278 
(.060) 
-.187 
(.040) 
Moved from charter after one 
year 
.285 
(.022) 
.203 
(.020) 
Moved from charter after two 
years 
.197 
(.032) 
.157 
(.029) 
Moved from charter after at 
least three years 
.055 
(.042) 
.015 
(.038) 
Moved from one charter to 
another 
-.033 
(.042) 
-.007 
(.038) 
   
Sample size 1,256,983 1,249,135 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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 The effect of moving from charter back to a traditional public school does vary 
significantly with the length of time that the student was observed in a charter school.  For math, 
the charter-to-public mover effect decreases from .285 for students who were in a charter for 
only one year to .055 for students who were in a charter for three or more years, and in reading 
the effect falls from .203 to .015.  One possible explanation for this is that there is a disruption in 
the first year in a charter school from which the students recover in the following years, whether 
they stay in a charter or move back to a traditional public school, so that by the time the student 
has been in a charter school for three years they have already rebounded from the first-year 
charter student drop, and thus show little effect from moving back to public, whereas students 
who move back to a public school after just one year in a charter experience the recovery in that 
year, leading to a positive effect on test score gains from a charter-to-public move. 
 In order to more fully explore the relationship between the number of years the student 
spends in a charter and the number of years the charter has been in operation, in Table 2.6 we 
interact the effect of charter tenure with student years of experience in charters.  We use a three-
by-four matrix, with student experience classified as one year, two years, or three years or more, 
and charter tenure classified as one year, two years, three years, or four years or more.12 
                                                                
12
 All of the math effects in Table 2.6 are from the same regression, as are all of the reading effects. 
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Table 2.6—Charter Attendance Effects, Interacting Charter Tenure With Student Years in a 
Charter 
   
Student in 1st 
year in a charter 
 
Student in 2nd 
year in a charter 
Student in 3rd or 
higher year at a 
charter 
Charter in 1st year of 
operation 
-.270 
(.048) 
- - 
Charter in 2nd year of 
operation 
-.183 
(.044) 
.072 
(.043) 
- 
Charter in 3rd year of 
operation 
-.204 
(.049) 
.107 
(.063) 
.128 
(.069) 
Math 
 
1,256,983 obs. 
 
Charter in 4th or higher 
year of operation 
-.197 
(.039) 
-.006 
(.039) 
.028 
(.049) 
Charter in 1st year of 
operation 
-.188 
(.038) 
- - 
Charter in 2nd year of 
operation 
-.174 
(.031) 
.009 
(.037) 
- 
Charter in 3rd year of 
operation 
-.134 
(.036) 
.087 
(.044) 
.122 
(.041) 
Reading 
 
1,249,135 obs. 
 
Charter in 4th or higher 
year of operation 
-.121 
(.025) 
.013 
(.028) 
.040 
(.039) 
 
Notes: The math and reading results presented here are each from one regression.  Robust standard errors, 
adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also include grade-by-year effects, an 
indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent African-American and percent 
Hispanic. 
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 The results in Table 2.6 highlight the importance of the stability of the negative first-
year charter student effect.  Although this negative first-year student effect is largest for students 
in first-year charters (-.270 in math, -.188 in reading), it is still negative and significant even for 
students in charters that have been in operation for four years or more (-.197 for math, -.121 for 
reading).  Across all levels of charter school tenure, students have significantly lower test scores 
in their first year in a charter.  However, the negative effect is smallest for the first-year students 
in charter schools that have been in operation for at least four years. 
 For students in their second year of charter school and beyond, the charter school effect 
is typically positive.  Although there doesn’t appear to be a clear trend, the largest positive 
effects for both second-year charter students and for third-year and higher charter students are 
for charter schools in their third year of operation. 
 One way to interpret these results is to follow a student who enters a new charter school 
and stays at that school for three years.  Their overall effect across their three years in the charter  
would be the sum of the first-year school/first-year student effect, the second-year 
school/second-year student effect, and the third-year school/third-year student effect.  For math, 
these three effects sum to -.070, and in reading they sum to -.057, indicating that the overall test 
score gains across the three years were slightly lower for these charter school students than they 
would have been in a traditional public school.  The same comparison for students moving into a 
second-year charter school yield similar results, with slightly negative overall gains across their 
first three years in the charter. 
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Table 2.7—Charter Attendance Effects, Average Effect Across Entire Span of Charter 
Attendance 
 
 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Students 
Observed in 
Category 
 
 
 
Math 
 
 
 
Reading 
Student attends charter last year in 
sample 
8,831 -.117 
(.029) 
-.082 
(.025) 
Student attends charter last two 
years in sample 
3,370 -.104 
(.025) 
-.042 
(.019) 
Student attends charter last three 
years in sample 
1,751 -.093 
(.030) 
-.036 
(.021) 
Student attends charter last four 
years in sample 
673 .109 
(.055) 
.035 
(.050) 
    
Student attends charter exactly 
one year, then returns to public 
4,571 -.059 
(.033) 
-.049 
(.028) 
Student attends charter exactly 
two years, then returns to public 
1,454 -.105 
(.035) 
-.053 
(.031) 
Student attends charter exactly 
three years, then returns to public 
385 -.074 
(.069) 
.095 
(.068) 
    
District mover 
 
 -.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
Campus mover 
 
 -.147 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
    
Sample size  1,237,284 1,237,284 
 
Notes: For the students that we observe returning to public school (rows 5-7), the charter effect is turned 
on in their first year back in public.  Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in 
parenthesis.  Regressions also include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special 
education, and campus percent African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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 Table 2.7 takes a different approach to estimating the overall effect of the full span of 
charter attendance on student achievement.  We divide up the students we observe in charter 
schools into groups, depending on how many years we observe them in a charter school and 
whether we observe them move back to a traditional public school during our data.  We can then 
estimate the average effect of charter attendance across all the years the student was in a charter 
for each of these different categories.13  We end up with four different categories of student that 
stay in charter school through the end of our sample, and three different categories of student 
that we observe move to a charter and then back to a traditional public school. 
 We do not include separate public-to-charter or charter-to-public mover effects in this 
specification, so the overall average effects capture both the effect of the transition to a charter 
and the effect of moving back to a public.  Additionally, we include the first year back in public 
as part of the effect (for those students that we observe moving back to a public), which allows 
us to see the overall impact of the move to a charter, the years in the charter, and the move back 
to a public school. 
 For students that remain in a charter school through the end of our data, the largest 
negative effect is for students who were in charter school for only the final year we observe them 
(-.117 for math, -.082 for reading).   This is not surprising, as this includes their negative effect 
from making a public-to-charter move.  The average effect is still negative for students that we 
observe in a charter for either their last two or their last three years in the data, but the magnitude 
is smaller, as the negative first-year charter student effect is being averaged over more years.  
For the 673 students that we observe in charter school for the final four years of our data, the 
average charter effect over the four years is positive but insignificant. 
                                                                
13
 We omit students that are in charter school already in the first year we observe them, as we have no way of knowing 
how long they were in charter school before we observed them. 
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 The next three lines in Table 2.7 show the average effects for students who we observe 
moving back to a public school.  The only category that has a positive average charter effect is in 
reading for students who attended a charter school for three years before returning to a public 
school.  For students who stayed in the charter school for one or two years the average charter 
effect is negative and significant at the 10% level for both reading and math.  For instance, the -
.105 average effect for students that stayed in a charter school for two years then returned to a 
traditional public school indicates that those students’ test score gains were on average .105 
lower during the years they were in charter school and their first year back in a traditional public 
than the test score gains for those students in traditional public schools.  Overall, it appears that 
students who move to charter schools during our data have lower average test score gains than 
they would have had in traditional public schools. 
 Because many charter schools in Texas focus primarily on serving students with low test 
scores prior to entering charter schools, it is interesting to look at how students at different initial 
performance levels do once they enter charter schools.  In Tables 2.8A and 2.8B we run our 
baseline specification separately by initial student achievement quartile, dividing the students up 
by their quartile in the overall state performance distribution, using the student’s test score in that 
subject in the first year the student is observed. 
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Table 2.8A—Math Charter Attendance Effects, Separately by Student Initial Math Quartile 
 
Variable 
Lowest 
Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Highest 
Quartile 
1st  year charter -.134 
(.060) 
-.078 
(.064) 
-.003 
(.065) 
.029 
(.066) 
2nd or 3rd year 
charter 
.063 
(.035) 
.007 
(.048) 
.096 
(.041) 
.071 
(.044) 
4th through 8th year 
charter 
.000 
(.041) 
.038 
(.049) 
.051 
(.054) 
.107 
(.044) 
     
District mover -.037 
(.009) 
-.044 
(.008) 
-.043 
(.009) 
-.033 
(.010) 
Campus mover -.169 
(.007) 
-.161 
(.007) 
-.142 
(.007) 
-.120 
(.007) 
Moved to charter 
from public 
-.199 
(.045) 
-.216 
(.051) 
-.250 
(.055) 
-.249 
(.052) 
Moved to public 
from charter 
.213 
(.028) 
.222 
(.029) 
.285 
(.036) 
.322 
(.040) 
Moved from one 
charter to another 
.022 
(.064) 
-.094 
(.069) 
.121 
(.091) 
-.124 
(.100) 
     
Sample size 308,617 324,503 311,838 304,979 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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 Table 2.8A shows the separate student quartile results for math.  The most positive 
charter effects are found for the students in the top two achievement quartiles, with the highest 
quartile students in well-established charter schools having the most positive effect,  .107.  The 
new charter school effect also changes dramatically with student initial achievement quartile, 
increasing from  -.134 for students in the lowest quartile to .029 for students in the highest 
quartile.  This difference is offset somewhat by the effect of making a public-to-charter move, 
which is negative for all categories of student, but largest in magnitude for the students in the 
highest achievement quartile (-.249, compared to -.199 for students in the lowest quartile).  
However, these high-performing students also have the largest positive effect of moving back to 
public school, .322, compared to .213 for the lowest quartile students. 
Table 2.8B shows the same specifications for reading scores.  Here the results are much 
more mixed.  The first-year and second or third-year charter effects are slightly more positive for 
the lower quartile students, but the effects are all insignificant, whereas the well-established 
charter school effect is positive throughout and highest for the top quartile students (.092, 
compared to .031 for the lowest quartile students).  There is no clear trend in either the public-to-
charter or charter-to-public mover effects, as they are of approximately the same magnitude for 
students in each initial quartile. 
38 
Table 2.8B—Reading Charter Attendance Effects, Separately by Student Initial Reading Quartile 
 
Variable 
Lowest 
Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Highest 
Quartile 
1st  year charter .028 
(.051) 
-.011 
(.046) 
-.031 
(.060) 
-.026 
(.059) 
2nd or 3rd year 
charter 
.043 
(.032) 
.044 
(.032) 
.033 
(.042) 
.024 
(.043) 
4th through 8th year 
charter 
.031 
(.043) 
.051 
(.034) 
.070 
(.050) 
.092 
(.041) 
     
District mover -.023 
(.009) 
-.024 
(.008) 
-.021 
(.009) 
-.031 
(.009) 
Campus mover -.134 
(.006) 
-.114 
(.006) 
-.098 
(.006) 
-.075 
(.006) 
Moved to charter 
from public 
-.188 
(.039) 
-.183 
(.036) 
-.177 
(.045) 
-.154 
(.042) 
Moved to public 
from charter 
.176 
(.027) 
.157 
(.026) 
.210 
(.035) 
.147 
(.039) 
Moved from one 
charter to another 
-.073 
(.069) 
-.018 
(.060) 
.190 
(.075) 
.006 
(.088) 
     
Sample size 307,529 320,367 295,975 315,937 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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Table 2.9—Charter Attendance Effects, Separate Effects for African-American, Hispanic, and 
Other Students 
Variable Math Reading 
1st  year charter, student is 
African-American 
-.058 
(.063) 
-.029 
(.064) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, student 
is African-American 
.149 
(.050) 
.075 
(.038) 
4th through 8th year charter, 
student is African-American 
.128 
(.045) 
.113 
(.036) 
1st  year charter, student is 
Hispanic 
.018 
(.071) 
.094 
(.042) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, student 
is Hispanic 
.052 
(.043) 
.038 
(.029) 
4th through 8th year charter, 
student is Hispanic 
-.037 
(.044) 
.011 
(.032) 
1st  year charter, other students 
 
-.110 
(.064) 
-.091 
(.047) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, other 
students 
-.037 
(.052) 
.022 
(.046) 
4th through 8th year charter, 
other students 
-.004 
(.042) 
-.006 
(.035) 
   
District mover 
 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
Campus mover 
 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
Moved to charter from public 
 
-.242 
(.039) 
-.189 
(.028) 
Moved to public from charter 
 
.243 
(.020) 
.173 
(.017) 
Moved from one charter to 
another 
-.050 
(.043) 
-.021 
(.036) 
   
Sample size 1,256,983 1,249,135 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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In Table 2.9, the charter effects are allowed to vary depending on whether the student is 
African-American, Hispanic, or other.  At first-year charter schools, the charter effect is most 
positive for Hispanic students, with effects of .018 in math and .014 in reading, but for the other 
charter effects the coefficients are most positive for African-American students.  For charter 
schools in operation for two or three years, the effects for African-American students are .149 
for math and .079 for reading, and for charter schools in operation for four or more years the 
effects are .128 for math and .113 for reading, substantially higher than for other student groups.  
Hispanic students have the next highest effects, and non-African-American, non-Hispanic 
students show the lowest effects, either negative or positive but insignificant. 
Although in some of our specifications we allow the effect of charter attendance to vary 
depending on how long the student stays in a charter, an additional check to make sure that our 
results are not being driven primarily by students who remain in a charter for only one or two 
years is to run our baseline specification excluding students who either stay in a charter for only 
one year, or who stay in a charter for only two years.  These results are shown in Table 2.10.  
The results here are consistent with those for the full sample, suggesting that there is little 
difference when these short charter duration students are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 2.10—Charter Attendance Effects, Limiting Sample to Student Observed in Charters for 
Multiple Years 
 Omitting students we 
observe in a charter for 
only one year 
Omitting students we 
observe in a charter for 
two or fewer years 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
1st  year charter 
 
-.075 
(.055) 
.043 
(.036) 
-.100 
(.065) 
.030 
(.046) 
2nd or 3rd year 
charter 
.052 
(.035) 
.042 
(.026) 
.078 
(.044) 
.061 
(.033) 
4th through 8th year 
charter 
-.015 
(.037) 
.021 
(.026) 
.011 
(.046) 
.041 
(.035) 
     
District mover 
 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
Campus mover 
 
-.147 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
-.147 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
Moved to charter 
from public 
-.246 
(.049) 
-.190 
(.033) 
-.270 
(.061) 
-.203 
(.044) 
Moved to public 
from charter 
.155 
(.029) 
.115 
(.025) 
.082 
(.046) 
.035 
(.041) 
Moved from one 
charter to another 
-.028 
(.042) 
-.019 
(.037) 
.011 
(.047) 
-.006 
(.045) 
     
Sample size 1,211,392 1,203,777 1,193,151 1,185,620 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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Table 2.11—Charter Attendance Effects, Interacting Effect With Whether the Student Was Ever 
Classified as Limited English Proficient or At-risk 
 Category is Limited 
English Proficiency 
 
Category is At-risk 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
1st  year charter, student observed 
in status 
.158 
(.085) 
.254 
(.060) 
-.024 
(.050) 
.023 
(.036) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, student 
observed in status 
.102 
(.055) 
.088 
(.041) 
.082 
(.035) 
.049 
(.025) 
4th through 8th year charter, 
student observed in status 
-.060 
(.053) 
.017 
(.046) 
.024 
(.040) 
.040 
(.030) 
1st  year charter, student not 
observed in status 
-.081 
(.044) 
-.045 
(.036) 
-.098 
(.057) 
-.048 
(.043) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, student not 
observed in status 
.065 
(.036) 
.041 
(.026) 
.025 
(.045) 
.037 
(.035) 
4th through 8th year charter, 
student not observed in status 
.052 
(.032) 
.051 
(.024) 
.020 
(.032) 
.042 
(.025) 
     
District mover 
 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
Campus mover 
 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
Moved to charter from public -.240 
(.039) 
-.188 
(.027) 
-.236 
(.041) 
-.184 
(.029) 
Moved to public from charter .240 
(.020) 
.170 
(.017) 
.238 
(.020) 
.171 
(.017) 
Moved from one charter to 
another 
-.040 
(.043) 
-.016 
(.037) 
-.032 
(.042) 
-.008 
(.038) 
     
Sample size 1,256,983 1,249,135 1,256,983 1,249,135 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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As mentioned before, one of the unique characteristics of the Texas charter school 
industry is that many Texas charter schools were chartered explicitly to serve primarily At-risk 
students.  Because many students who attend charter schools were classified as At-risk prior to 
entering charter school, it is interesting to see if students who were ever classified as At-risk do 
better or worse at charter schools than other students.  In Table 2.11 we address this issue, 
interacting the charter effects with an indicator for whether the student was ever classified as 
limited English proficient (first two columns) or At-risk (last two columns). 
For limited English proficient students, we get the striking result that LEP students 
actually do better in first-year charter schools, with effects of .158 in math and .254 in reading.  
Combining those effects with the -.240 public-to-charter mover effect, there is a much smaller 
overall negative first-year effect for LEP students in math, and no negative first-year effect at all 
in reading, compared to other students.  The estimated effects for LEP students decline however 
in charter schools that have been in operation for more than one year, with LEP students in 
charters that were in operation at least four years doing worse than non-LEP students (-.060 
versus .052 in math, .017 versus .051 in reading). 
For At-risk students the differences are smaller, with At-risk students having slightly 
more positive effects than non-At-risk students in charter schools that are either in their first year 
or their second or third year of operation, and almost identical effects in well-established 
schools. 
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Table 2.12—Charter Attendance Effects, Separate Effects Depending on Charter Schools 
Serving Predominantly At-risk Students 
Variable Math Reading 
1st  year charter, campus serves 
mainly At-risk students 
-.050 
(.049) 
.005 
(.034) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, campus serves 
mainly At-risk students 
.073 
(.037) 
.045 
(.025) 
4th through 8th year charter, campus 
serves mainly At-risk students 
.007 
(.046) 
.030 
(.032) 
1st  year charter, campus serves 
mainly non-At-risk students 
-.022 
(.084) 
.001 
(.062) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, campus serves 
mainly non-At-risk students 
.023 
(.062) 
.040 
(.049) 
4th through 8th year charter, campus 
serves mainly non-At-risk students 
.083 
(.082) 
.078 
(.041) 
   
District mover 
 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
Campus mover 
 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
Moved to charter from public 
 
-.233 
(.040) 
-.183 
(.029) 
Moved to public from charter 
 
.239 
(.020) 
.171 
(.017) 
Moved from one charter to another -.026 
(.042) 
-.005 
(.038) 
   
Sample size 1,256,983 1,249,135 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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It is also possible that the difference in performance doesn’t depend on whether the 
student is classified as At-risk or not, but rather whether the charter school is focused on serving 
primarily At-risk students.  One way to check this is to divide charter schools up by whether they 
have at least 50% students who were ever classified as At-risk.  In Table 2.12 we do this, 
allowing the charter school effect to vary for high-At-risk and low-At-risk charters.  The results 
do not show a substantial difference between the two groups of charter schools, with charters 
serving primarily At-risk students having a more positive effect for second or third-year charters, 
and charters that serve primarily non-At-risk students having a more positive effect for charters 
in their fourth year or higher of operation.  Basically, whether the student is At-risk or the school 
is focused on At-risk students does not appear to have a large impact on the estimated charter 
achievement effects. 
 
SUMMARY 
 By carefully controlling for the effect of a student being in their first year in a charter 
school, we have shown that students tend to experience a decline in test scores in their first year 
in a charter school, followed by a rapid recovery.  This can lead to misleading results when great 
weight is placed on the transition year, as it naturally is in a growing industry where a large 
percentage of the charters students are observed in their first year in a charter school.  By 
separately estimating the effect of charter attendance on students who remain in charter school 
for varying lengths of time we have found evidence that those students who remain in charter 
schools for multiple years have slightly lower average math and reading test score growth while 
in charter schools.  Briefly experimenting with charter schools and then returning to a traditional 
public school also appears to have a small negative impact on student performance. 
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 We do find evidence that charter schools that have been in operation longer have higher 
average student gains than new charter schools, but no matter how long the charter school has 
been in operation, new charter students continue to do poorly at those schools.  We also find 
evidence that African-American students do better at charter schools than other students, and that 
charter school attendance has the most negative impact on the performance of non-African-
American, non-Hispanic students. 
 Although the overall story for the effect of charter schools on student achievement is that 
charters have average test score gains that are the same or slightly lower than traditional public 
schools, the interesting interactions between student years in a charter and charter years of 
operation indicate the overall effect of charter schools on student achievement is richer and more 
complex than simply saying charter schools are “good” or “bad,” in terms of their impact on 
student performance. 
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CHAPTER III 
CHARTER COMPETITION EFFECTS 
 
 
 Although much of the debate about charter schools has focused on how students who 
attend the charter schools perform relative to students in traditional public schools, perhaps the 
more important effect of charters schools is the effect they have on the performance of students 
in nearby traditional public schools.  School choice advocates claim that charter schools could 
increase educational outcomes for all students by providing incentives for inefficient public 
schools to improve.  There is a significant literature that suggests that public schools are not 
typically cost efficient, and that lack of competition in the education market may be an important 
cause of this inefficiency.14  If choice reforms such as charter schools increase the degree of 
competition in the education sector, then increasing efficiency could lead to improved outcomes 
for all students. 
 The new and expanding charter school industry is an important opportunity to test the 
systemic effect of competition on the performance of public school students.  Because the large 
majority of public school students remain in traditional public schools, this potential for a 
positive competitive effect is arguably of greater importance than the direct performance effects 
of charter school attendance.  Although charter schools are public schools and do receive public 
funding, they have more freedom in choosing their curriculum, hiring and compensating 
teachers, and in targeting specific types of students.  This ability for charters to differentiate their 
product from traditional public schools makes charter schools potentially strong competitors in 
the education market. 
 A key issue in evaluating the competitive effect of charter schools is how to measure 
charter competition.  Conceptually, the passage of the law allowing charter schools could be 
                                                                
14
 See Hoxby (2000), Grosskopf et al. (2004) for examples of this literature. 
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taken as the key point of increased charter competition, as from that point forward every 
traditional public school district faced the threat of entry by charter schools.  School districts 
might improve in response to this threat without a single charter school ever forming.  
Empirically, this type of competitive effect could be tested for with an event-study, evaluating 
the effect of the passage of the charter law. 
 An alternative measure of charter competition would be the degree to which charter 
schools have become well-established locally, at a level that can provide meaningful competition 
for the traditional public school district or campus.  This is the approach we take here, measuring 
charter competition by the number of charter schools or students within a certain geographic 
area.  We use an education production function approach to evaluate whether this type of charter 
competition has any effect on student performance. 
 Public schools in Texas faced some degree of competition even before the passage of 
charter legislation.  Tiebout competition from surrounding public schools provides some 
competitive pressure, as does the presence of private school options.  Charter competition is 
different in that parents can take advantage of the charter option without paying additional 
tuition or moving to a new school district.  We measure the effect of charter competition, 
assuming that Tiebout and private competition levels are constant over the time period.  If there 
is substantial substitution by parents between charter schools and private schools, charter 
competition may not have as large an effect as it would have if all charter students switched over 
from traditional public schools. 
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CHARTER PENETRATION IN TEXAS 
 Since legislation authorizing charter schools was passed in Texas in 1995, the charter 
school industry in Texas has flourished, both in number of charter schools and in the number of 
charter students.  One reason for this rapid expansion is that Texas has charter laws that are 
relatively favorable to charter formation.  Unlike some states where the school district is the 
chartering agency, in Texas the State Board of Education is the principal chartering agency for 
open enrollment charter schools, which should facilitate greater competition between charters 
and traditional public school districts.15 
 Additionally, the funding of charter schools is Texas is quite favorable to charters, with 
the charter school receiving the full state and local funding that the student would have received 
in the traditional public school, conditioned on their student characteristics.  This contrasts with 
states like Michigan, where only a portion of the state and local funding follows the student to a 
charter school.  This allows charter schools in Texas to compete with traditional public schools 
more effectively. 
 Charter schools in Texas are concentrated mainly in the large urban areas, such as 
Houston, Dallas and Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Austin.  Charter schools must draw in a 
minimum number of students in order to be successful, and this is presumably easier in areas 
with higher student density.  Because of this observed charter school concentration, it is likely 
that the effects of charter competition will be felt most strongly in the urban school districts in 
Texas. 
                                                                
15
 Texas charter school law allows both open enrollment charter schools, which are independent school districts, and 
district-chartered charter schools, which are chartered by an existing public school district and function as a part of 
that school district.  In this dissertation we examine the impact of open enrollment charter schools. 
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Table 3.1—Charter Penetration of Public School Districts 
 
 
 
Year 
Number of 
Districts with 
at least one 
Charter 
Total Enrollment 
in Districts with 
at least one 
Charter 
Percent of Public 
Enrollment in 
Districts with at 
least one Charter 
2003-04 70 1,829,382 43.0 
2002-03 70 1,815,280 43.4 
2001-02 67 1,738,360 41.9 
2000-01 59 1,587,469 39.1 
1999-00 40 963,714 24.2 
1998-99 21 940,460 23.9 
1997-98 10 632,311 16.3 
1996-97 5 158,765 4.2 
 
Notes: District with at least one charter means a traditional public school district with at least one open 
enrollment charter school within its geographic boundaries. 
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 Table 3.1 shows the extent to which charter schools have penetrated traditional public 
school districts in Texas.  By 2003-04 there were 70 school districts in Texas with at least one 
charter school within their geographic boundaries, and those 70 districts contained 43 percent of 
the total public school enrollment in Texas. 
 
MODEL 
 As in Chapter II, we use a restricted form of the education production function described 
by Todd and Wolpin (2003).  Because charter schools may locate where the surrounding public 
schools are low-performing, it is especially important to control not only for unmeasured student 
ability but also for unmeasured school quality.  One way to do this is to add a campus fixed 
effect to our student test score gains model from Chapter II, giving us the following equation: 
(1) iticitit SA εµφβ +++=∆ 1  
where φc is the campus fixed effect, Ait is the achievement of student i in year t, Sit is a vector of 
school inputs, µi is the student fixed effect, and εit is the error term. 
 Equation 1 is difficult to estimate directly, at least for the sample size that we are using.  
In order to make the model computationally tractable, we combine the campus and student fixed 
effects into a single campus-student spell fixed effect, representing each unique campus-student 
combination.16  This yields the following equation: 
(2) itciitit SA εθβ ++=∆ 1  
where θci is the campus-student spell effect for campus c and student i. 
 This specification controls for time-invariant campus and student characteristics, and for 
large samples is a close approximation of the model with separate campus and student fixed 
effects.  The spell effects model also has the advantage that the effects resulting from the model 
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 See Sass (2006) and Andrews, Schank, and Upward (2004) for a more in depth discussion of spell fixed effects. 
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are relatively easy to interpret, as they represent the difference between test score gains for 
students at the campus while it was in treatment, relative to the test score gains of those same 
students while they were at that same campus when it was out of treatment, or faced lower levels 
of treatment. 
 One major issue in measuring the effect of charter competition is dealing with the 
endogenous choice by charter schools of where to locate.  Because charter schools may tend to 
locate near public schools of low quality, it is essential to control for unobservable school quality 
when measuring the competitive effects.  By including spell fixed effects we control for this 
unobservable school quality, which would otherwise bias the resulting effects estimates.   
However, if there are time-varying campus characteristics that are associated with being 
near charter schools, and these time-varying characteristics are also correlated with student test 
score gains, then these could still cause the bias in the model.  For instance, during this time 
period the No Child Left Behind law was passed, and the penalties associated with failing to 
meet school accountability targets were increased, which would put added pressure on schools to 
improve performance, and could arguably have a stronger effect on low performing schools.  If 
this NCLB pressure is correlated with our charter competition measure, some of the NCLB 
effect could be picked up in the estimated effect of charter competition. 
An additional difficulty in interpreting the effect that we call charter competition is that, 
as low-performing students leave for charter schools, the remaining students may do better for 
reasons that are not associated with a competitive response from public schools.  There may be 
positive peer effects associated with losing the lowest performing students, or those students may 
demand a disproportionate share of the school’s resources, which can then be allocated to the 
remaining students.  These factors are other possible explanations for what we call the charter 
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competition effect, and it is difficult to distinguish between these different possible 
interpretations of the effect. 
We use two different methods of measuring charter competition.  One measure is at the 
district level, and is constructed as the percent of students in grades 3-8 within the district’s 
geographic boundaries that attend charter schools in that year.17  We refer to this measure as the 
district-level geographic charter competition measure. 
The other charter competition measure is at the campus level, and is constructed using 
the distance between the public campus and surrounding charter campuses.18  We construct this 
measure in three different ways.  The first method is the number of charter schools that serve 
grades 3-8 within a five-mile radius, and within a 6-10 mile radius.  The second method is an 
indicator for whether there is a charter school that serves grades 3-8 within a five-mile radius, 
and within a 6-10 mile radius.  The third method is the number of grade 3-8 charter students 
(divided by 1000) within a five-mile radius, and within a 6-10 mile radius.  We use all three 
campus-level measures, but primarily focus on the results using the first method, the number of 
charter schools within an N-mile radius. 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The data set used in this chapter is a subset of the full student data set described in 
Chapter I, with data on Texas students in grades 3-8 from 1993-94 through 2003-04.  All data 
came from the Texas Education Agency.  The data include student math and reading test scores 
for every tested student in the state of Texas on the TAAS test (through 2001-02) or the TAKS 
test (2002-03 and 2003-04), both statewide standardized achievement tests.  The data also 
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 We restrict our competition measures to only students in grades 3-8, or school that serve grades 3-8, as those are the 
students in our estimation sample. 
18
 Thanks to Lori Taylor for supplying the campus latitude/longitude data used to calculate the campus-to-campus 
distances. 
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include student demographic indicators, including race/ethnicity, gender, free or reduced price 
lunch eligibility, limited English proficiency, special education status, and whether the student is 
classified as At-risk.  The data include a unique student identifier, which we use to track 
individual students over time as they move between charter schools and traditional public 
schools.  We also have campus-level and district-level data sets with campus and district 
demographic data. 
 Because the full sample of students in Texas over this time period is too large to make 
estimation using the full sample computationally tractable, we randomly sampled a smaller 
group of students for our estimation sample.  The students that we are most interested in keeping 
are students in districts that face charter competition, as they are the ones contributing to the 
estimated charter competition effect.  We keep every student at in a district with fewer than 5000 
students that ever had charter schools within their geographic boundaries, 20% of the students in 
districts with more than 5000 students that ever had charter schools, 10% of students in districts 
with fewer than 5000 students that never had charter schools, and 5% of students in districts with 
more than 5000 student that never had charter schools.19  All of the regressions are weighted to 
account for this differential sampling probability.20  In addition, we drop all students that we ever 
observe in a charter school from our sample. 
                                                                
19
 The sampling was done at the student level, so when a student is kept we keep every student-year observation for 
that student.  For sampling purposes, each student was assigned to the district that they were observed the most 
frequently in. 
20
 The weight is the inverse of the probability that the student was chosen for our sample. 
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Table 3.2—Summary Statistics for Chapter III Estimation Sample 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Overall 
Sample 
Mean 
Mean for 
Students in 
Districts 
with 
Charters 
Mean for 
Students in 
Districts 
without 
Charters 
Number of student-year observations 1,316,667 1,029,565 287,102 
Number of unique students 428,959 336,921 92,038 
    
District geographic percent charter .007 
(.016) 
.009 
(.018) 
- 
Number of charters within a 5-mile 
radius of public campus 
.943 
(2.23) 
1.13 
(2.45) 
.262 
(.899) 
Number of charters within a 6-10 
mile radius 
1.67 
(3.36) 
1.84 
(3.51) 
1.04 
(2.64) 
At least one charter within a 5-mile 
radius of public campus 
.313 .362 .136 
At least one charter within a 6-10 
mile radius of public campus 
.143 .138 .159 
Number of charter students within a 
5-mile radius of public campus 
(divided by 1000) 
.219 
(.663) 
.264 
(.731) 
.058 
(.247) 
Number of charter students within a 
6-10 mile radius of public campus 
(divided by 1000) 
.382 
(.954) 
.416 
(.999) 
.263 
(.758) 
    
African-American .163 .184 .090 
Hispanic .401 .431 .290 
FRL Eligible .480 .513 .366 
Limited English proficient .064 .072 .034 
Special education .056 .056 .054 
    
Standardized Math score -.013 
(.978) 
-.056 
(.984) 
.143 
(.939) 
Standardized Reading score -.004 
(.969) 
-.042 
(.976) 
.134 
(.932) 
Change in Math score -.005 
(.674) 
-.007 
(.677) 
.004 
(.664) 
Change in Reading score .003 
(.704) 
.003 
(.705) 
.005 
(.699) 
    
Campus percent African-American .162 .180 .100 
Campus percent Hispanic .414 .442 .315 
Campus percent FRL eligible .530 .559 .425 
Campus percent limited English 
proficient 
.132 .144 .088 
Campus percent special education  .124 .123 .128 
 
Notes: Standard deviations for non-binary variables shown in parenthesis.
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 Because we are comparing test scores across different testing regimes with differently 
shaped student test score distributions, it is necessary to standardize the scores so that they are 
comparable over time.  We use rank-based Z-score to standardize the scores, which fit the 
statewide student score distributions onto a normal distribution scores, which fits the statewide 
scores onto a normal distribution by grade, year, and test. 
 Table 3.2 has summary statistics for the student sample used in the charter competition 
regressions.  The first column shows the means for the entire sample, the second column for 
students in districts that have charter schools in any year, and the third column for students in 
districts that never have charter schools.  Comparing the last two columns, we can see that 
students in our sample from districts with charter schools are more likely to be African-
American, Hispanic, free or reduced price lunch eligible, and limited English proficient, 
compared to students in our sample from districts without charter schools.  Students in our 
sample from districts with charter schools are also lower performing on average in both math 
and reading than other students in our sample, although the average math and reading gains are 
similar across the two groups. 
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Table 3.3—Estimated Effect of District-level Charter Competition on Math and Reading Gains 
  Math   Reading  
 
 
Variable 
 
No Fixed 
Effects 
Campus 
Fixed 
Effects 
Student 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
No Fixed 
Effects 
Campus 
Fixed 
Effects 
Student 
Fixed 
Effects 
Percent of students 
in geographic 
district attending 
charter schools 
.057 
(.143) 
.688 
(.159) 
.426 
(.325) 
.143 
(.096) 
.322 
(.118) 
.755 
(.239) 
District mover 
 
-.042 
(.004) 
-.027 
(.004) 
-.037 
(.006) 
-.031 
(.004) 
-.019 
(.004) 
-.027 
(.006) 
Campus mover 
 
-.131 
(.004) 
-.079 
(.004) 
-.138 
(.006) 
-.093 
(.003) 
-.055 
(.004) 
-.098 
(.004) 
Student in special 
education 
-.004 
(.003) 
-.007 
(.003) 
.013 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.003 
(.003) 
.020 
(.010) 
Student is African-
American 
-.006 
(.003) 
-.007 
(.003) 
- -.008 
(.003) 
-.009 
(.003) 
- 
Student is Hispanic 
 
-.006 
(.003) 
-.007 
(.002) 
- -.010 
(.002) 
-.010 
(.002) 
- 
Student is FRL 
eligible 
-.009 
(.002) 
-.008 
(.002) 
- -.012 
(.002) 
-.011 
(.002) 
- 
Student is limited 
English proficient 
.068 
(.004) 
.084 
(.004) 
- .112 
(.004) 
.120 
(.004) 
- 
Campus percent 
LEP 
.089 
(.015) 
- .295 
(.026) 
.024 
(.012) 
- .097 
(.021) 
Campus percent 
FRL eligible 
.019 
(.012) 
- .261 
(.025) 
-.009 
(.009) 
- .133 
(.021) 
Campus percent 
African-American 
-.047 
(.012) 
- -.106 
(.025) 
.008 
(.010) 
- -.010 
(.021) 
Campus percent 
Hispanic 
-.068 
(.004) 
- -.290 
(.029) 
.005 
(.008) 
- -.089 
(.025) 
Campus percent 
special education 
-.229 
(.041) 
- -.410 
(.059) 
-.135 
(.031) 
- -.226 
(.049) 
       
Sample size 1,271,331 1,272,330 1,315,609 1,264,091 1,265,073 1,308,067 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects. 
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RESULTS 
 Table 3.3 shows the first results estimating the effect of district-level charter competition 
(defined as the percent of the students in grades 3-8 within the geographic boundaries of the 
public school district attending charter schools).  There are three different specifications 
presented, the first including no fixed effects, the second including campus fixed effects, and the 
third including student fixed effects.  These are primarily included for comparison with the 
baseline model, which includes campus-student spell fixed effects.  The baseline model is 
presented in Table 3.4. 
 In Table 3.3, with no fixed effects included, the coefficient on the district-level charter 
competition variable is .057 for math and .143 for reading.  Considering that even the districts 
with the most charter competition had barely five percent of their geographic students in charter 
schools in 2003-0421, even a one percentage point increase in district-level charter competition is 
a fairly substantial increase, which would mean a .01 increase in the competition variable.  These 
coefficients imply that a one percentage point increase in competition is associated with a .0006 
increase in math test score gains, and a .0014 increase in reading test score gains, essentially no 
effect. 
 However, when either campus or student fixed effects are added to the model, the 
competition effect increases dramatically.  For math it increases to .688 with campus fixed 
effects and to .426 with student fixed effects, and similar magnitude increases occur for the 
reading effects.  These correspond to increases in test score gains of .007 and .004 respectively, 
still small effect sizes, but larger than with no fixed effects. 
 It is not surprising that adding campus or student fixed effects increases the size of the 
estimated charter competition effect.  As we will show in Chapter IV, students who go to charter 
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 Houston ISD and Dallas ISD, the two districts with the most charter schools, had approximately five percent and 
four percent charter competition in 2003-04, respectively. 
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schools tend to leave traditional public schools that are low performing, so adding campus fixed 
effects controls for these differences in time-invariant campus characteristics, including average 
score levels, which would otherwise ensure that public schools facing charter competition would 
appear to be low-performing.  Additionally, we can control directly for the differences between 
student ability in schools that face competition and in schools that don’t face competition by 
including student fixed effects in the model, controlling for any time-invariant student 
characteristics.  Either of these controls is likely to increase the estimated effect of charter 
competition on student test score gains. 
 Ideally we could control for both time-invariant campus and student effects by including 
both campus and student fixed effects directly in the model.  However this is computationally 
intractable with a student sample as large as we have, so we must try alternatives.  The 
specification we use as our baseline specification includes campus-student spell fixed effects, 
which combines each unique campus-student combination into a single “spell.”   
 Table 3.4 shows the results from our baseline model with spell fixed effects, for both 
district-level and campus-level charter competition.  Controlling for both campus and student 
time-invariant characteristics with the spell fixed effects causes the district-level competition 
effect to increase substantially, to 3.80 in math and 3.01 in reading.  These effects correspond to 
a .038 increase in math gains from a one percentage point increase in charter competition, and a 
.030 increase in reading gains.  Considering that the standard deviation in the test score levels is 
equal to one, increasing average test score gains by .038 is a reasonably large improvement. 
60 
Table 3.4—Charter Competition Effect, With Campus-Student Spell Fixed Effects 
  
 
District-level competition 
Campus-level 
competition (# of charters 
within an N-mile radius) 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
Percent of students in 
geographic district 
attending charter schools 
3.80 
(1.06) 
3.01 
(.842) 
- - 
# of charters within five 
miles of public campus 
- - .021 
(.006) 
.021 
(.005) 
# of charters within 6-10 
miles of public campus 
- - .010 
(.004) 
.008 
(.003) 
District mover 
 
-.046 
(.014) 
-.030 
(.015) 
-.047 
(.016) 
-.025 
(.016) 
Campus mover 
 
-.110 
(.011) 
-.071 
(.010) 
-.108 
(.012) 
-.070 
(.011) 
Student in special 
education 
.018 
(.023) 
.018 
(.024) 
.020 
(.024) 
.019 
(.026) 
     
Sample size 1,316,667 1,309,109 1,199,938 1,193,323 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects. 
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 For the campus-level competition effect, there are competition measure consists of two 
variables, the number of charter schools within a five-mile radius of the public campus, and the 
number of charter schools within a 6-10 mile radius of the public campus.22  In our baseline 
specification the effect of number of charter schools within a 5-mile radius is .021, and within a 
6-10 mile radius the effect is .010, so adding an additional charter school within a five-mile 
radius is associated with a .021 increase in test score gains, and about half that effect for adding a 
charter school within 6-10 miles.  The effects on reading scores are similar, .021 and .008 
respectively.  With many public campuses in Houston and Dallas having five or more charter 
schools within a five-mile radius, this can lead to quite significant effect sizes. 
 Table 3.5 shows the results from the same specification, but with two alternative 
measures of campus-level charter competition.  The first alternative is an indicator for whether 
there is a charter school within a five-mile radius or a 6-10 mile radius of the public campus.  
This specification results in small positive but insignificant effects for the five-mile radius on 
both math and reading scores, and negative effects for both math and reading at the 6-10 mile 
radius. 
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 Additional radii of charter competition were tested, up to a 30-mile radius, but only the 10-mile a lower radii ever 
had a significant effect. 
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Table 3.5—Campus-level Charter Competition Effect, Alternative Specifications 
 Campus-level 
competition (has a 
charter within an N-mile 
radius) 
Campus-level 
competition (# of charter 
students within an N-mile 
radius, divided by 1000) 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
Public campus is within 
five miles of a charter 
.021 
(.016) 
.006 
(.015) 
- - 
Public campus is within 6-
10 miles of a charter 
-.022 
(.016) 
-.026 
(.014) 
- - 
# of charter students within 
five miles of public 
campus (divided by 1000) 
- - .060 
(.023) 
.064 
(.020) 
# of charter students within 
6-10 miles of public 
campus (divided by 1000) 
- - .047 
(.014) 
.030 
(.012) 
     
Sample size 1,199,938 1,193,323 1,199,938 1,193,323 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, student mover variables, and an indicator for the student being in special 
education. 
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 The second alternative measure of campus-level charter competition is the number of 
charter students within a five-mile or a 6-10 mile radius of the public campus.  The results from 
this specification are very similar to the version with number of charter schools within an N-mile 
radius, with a .060 effect on math score gains at the five-mile radius and a .047 effect at the 10 
mile radius, and similar effects on reading.  From this point forward we will use primarily the 
first definition of campus-level charter competition, the number of charter schools within an N-
mile radius of the public campus. 
 Table 3.6 extends the baseline specification by allowing the charter competition effect to 
vary depending on whether the public school student is African-American, Hispanic, or other.  
Interestingly, for both district-level and campus-level competition the competitive effect is most 
positive on African-American students, then Hispanic students, with very little or no effect on 
other students.  For instance, in the math district-level competition specification the effect for 
African-American students is 4.75, for Hispanic students it is 4.14, and for other students it is 
1.43, so the estimated effect of charter competition on African-American students is over three 
times as large as on non-African-American, non-Hispanic students.  
 This pattern, with the largest effects for African-American students and the smallest 
effects for non-African-American, non-Hispanic students, fits with the idea of public schools 
responding to potential or realized competition by shifting resources towards the students that 
are most likely to leave for a charter.  As we will show more explicitly in Chapter IV, African-
American students are significantly more likely to transfer to a charter school than other 
students, so it is logical that the schools would focus their efforts to improve the performance of 
African-American students. 
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Table 3.6—Charter Competition Effect, With Different Effects for African-American, Hispanic,  
and Other Students 
  
 
District-level competition 
Campus-level 
competition (# of charters 
within an N-mile radius) 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
District geographic charter percent, 
student is African-American 
4.75 
(1.65) 
4.43 
(1.27) 
- - 
District geographic charter percent, 
student is Hispanic 
4.14 
(1.22) 
3.23 
(1.06) 
- - 
District geographic charter percent, 
other students 
1.43 
(1.03) 
-.005 
(.996) 
- - 
# of charters within five miles of 
public campus, student is African-
American 
- - .023 
(.009) 
.030 
(.008) 
# of charters within five miles of 
public campus, student is Hispanic 
- - .017 
(.007) 
.017 
(.007) 
# of charters within five miles of 
public campus, other students 
- - .012 
(.005) 
.003 
(.009) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of 
public campus, student is African-
American 
- - .022 
(.006) 
.013 
(.006) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of 
public campus, student is Hispanic 
- - .013 
(.005) 
.012 
(.004) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of 
public campus, other students 
- - -.001 
(.005) 
.000 
(.005) 
     
Sample size 1,316,667 1,309,109 1,199,938 1,193,323 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, student mover variables, and an indicator for the student being in special 
education. 
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 By the same token, one might expect that schools facing charter competition would 
divert their resources towards improving the performance of their lowest performing students, as 
those students are also more likely to leave for a charter school.  We investigate this possibility 
in Table 3.7, which runs the baseline competition specification separately depending on the 
achievement quartile of the student in the first year that they are observed in our data.  The table 
shows the results of sixteen different regressions: math and reading, four different initial 
achievement quartiles, district-level and campus-level charter competition. 
 The results in Table 3.7 show little evidence that charter competition effects vary 
significantly for students with different initial achievement levels.  The only measure that seems 
to have any systematic variation is the effect of campus-level charter competition on student 
math gains, where the coefficient on number of charter schools within a five-mile radius goes 
from .021 for the lowest quartile students to .038 for the highest quartile students, with almost 
twice as large an effect for the highest quartile students as for the lowest.  However, none of the 
other charter competition measures show a similar pattern, so this is weak evidence of any 
relationship between student initial achievement levels and the effect of charter competition. 
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Table 3.7—Charter Competition Effect, Separately by Student Initial Achievement Quartile 
 
Variable 
Lowest 
Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Highest 
Quartile 
Math, District-level 
geographic charter 
competition 
 
4.60 
(1.53) 
 
5.19 
(1.34) 
 
4.95 
(1.17) 
 
5.17 
(1.23) 
 
Reading, District-level 
geographic charter 
competition 
 
4.40 
(1.33) 
 
3.59 
(1.14) 
 
4.48 
(1.18) 
 
3.58 
(1.10) 
 
Math, # of charters 
within five miles of 
public campus 
.021 
(.009) 
.026 
(.008) 
.029 
(.009) 
.038 
(.010) 
Math, # of charters 
within 6-10 miles of 
public campus 
 
.019 
(.006) 
.014 
(.006) 
.009 
(.006) 
.002 
(.006) 
Reading, # of charters 
within five miles of 
public campus 
.025 
(.008) 
.023 
(.008) 
.036 
(.008) 
.023 
(.009) 
Reading, # of charters 
within 6-10 miles of 
public campus 
.012 
(.005) 
.008 
(.006) 
.006 
(.006) 
.007 
(.006) 
 
Notes: The table has the results from sixteen different regressions: math and reading, district-level and 
campus-level competition, four different student quartiles.  Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-
school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also include grade-by-year effects, student mover variables, 
and an indicator for the student being in special education. 
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 An alternative hypothesis would be that, rather than the effect of charter competition 
varying by the initial achievement level of the student, it might instead vary by the initial 
average achievement level of the campus.  If there is any district-level resource reallocation in 
response to a charter threat it would likely take the form of targeting more resources for those 
campuses that are most in danger of losing substantial numbers of students to charters, rather 
than targeting individual students.  In Table 3.8 we investigate this possibility, allowing the 
effect of charter competition to vary depending on the achievement quartile of the public campus 
in 1994 (calculated using campus average standardized math and reading scores). 
 The results in Table 3.8 show a dramatic difference between the effect of charter 
competition on students at public campuses in the bottom half of average student achievement 
distribution, relative to students at campuses in the top half of the distribution.  The district-level 
competition effect on math scores for students at campuses in the lowest quartile is 6.01, and for 
reading scores it is 5.46, meaning that an extra percentage point of students in the district 
attending charters is associated with a .06 increase in math score gains, and a .055 increase in 
reading score gains, a considerable effect.  Meanwhile, the effects for the top two quartile 
campuses are negative and insignificant.  Similar patterns hold for reading and for campus-level 
competition, with the entire positive effect of charter competition occurring for the campuses 
with low initial average performance. 
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Table 3.8—Charter Competition Effect, Effects Vary by Campus Initial Performance Quartile 
  
 
District-level competition 
Campus-level 
competition (# of charters 
within an N-mile radius) 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
District geographic charter percent, 
campus in lowest quartile 
6.01 
(1.54) 
5.46 
(1.16) 
- - 
District geographic charter percent, 
campus in second quartile 
3.84 
(1.80) 
3.09 
(1.45) 
- - 
District geographic charter percent, 
campus in third quartile 
-.370 
(2.14) 
-.900 
(1.32) 
- - 
District geographic charter percent, 
campus in highest quartile 
-1.14 
(2.56) 
-1.07 
(1.90) 
- - 
# of charters within five miles of public 
campus, campus in lowest quartile 
- - .015 
(.008) 
.020 
(.007) 
# of charters within five miles of public 
campus, campus in second quartile 
- - .028 
(.014) 
.026 
(.013) 
# of charters within five miles of public 
campus, campus in third quartile 
- - .012 
(.016) 
.006 
(.007) 
# of charters within five miles of public 
campus, campus in highest quartile 
- - .009 
(.011) 
.003 
(.012) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of public 
campus, campus in lowest quartile 
- - .023 
(.006) 
.020 
(.006) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of public 
campus, campus in second quartile 
- - .008 
(.010) 
.006 
(.007) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of public 
campus, campus in third quartile 
- - .011 
(.009) 
.000 
(.009) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of public 
campus, campus in highest quartile 
- - -.002 
(.006) 
.001 
(.006) 
     
Sample size 1,174,861 1,168,114 1,081,216 1,075,314 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, student mover variables, and an indicator for the student being in special 
education. 
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SUMMARY 
 We find that charter competition, as measured by the availability of charter schools at 
either the district or campus level, has a positive effect on student math and reading test score 
gains.  The estimated effect sizes tend to be fairly small, but even a small increase in the growth 
rate of student test scores can have a large impact on student achievement over time.  We also 
find that this positive competitive effect is largest for African-American and Hispanic students, 
and that the competitive effect is focused entirely on students in schools that are in the lowest 
50% of the average student achievement distribution. 
 Although we call this effect a charter competition effect, there are other possible 
explanations for the improvements in student test score gains in districts and campuses with 
nearby charter schools, including positive peer effects.  However, it seems clear that there is 
something causing test score growth to increase at public schools that face competitive pressures 
from charter schools. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CHARTER DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS 
 
 
 Although there have been many studies of the effect of charter schools on student 
achievement,23 there have been relatively few studies that examine the issue of which students 
are choosing to go to charter schools, and what effect charter schools are having on the 
distribution of students by race/ethnicity and student ability.  In this chapter we address both 
those issues, as well as link the resulting information to the analysis of student achievement from 
the prior two chapters. 
 Critics of charter schools argue that evidence of high student performance in charter 
schools may be due to those charters recruiting the best students from traditional public schools, 
and that in the process the expansion of the charter school industry may lead to greater racial and 
ability segregation in the public school system.24  If charter schools were to take away the best 
public school students, this could have negative peer effects for students remaining in traditional 
public schools.  On the other hand, charter schools could cause public schools to become more 
integrated by allowing families to choose schools outside of racially segregated neighborhoods. 
 Although some information can be gained about the distributional effect of charter 
schools by comparing overall average demographics in charter schools with student 
demographics in traditional public schools, the ability to track individual students as they move 
between charters and traditional public schools allows us to undertake a more detailed analysis 
of the charter mover effect.  We can see definitively whether students transferring into charter 
schools are moving to charter schools that are more or less homogeneous, by race/ethnicity and 
ability, than the traditional public schools they left. 
                                                                
23
 See for example Buddin and Zimmer (2005), Booker et al. (2004), Sass (2006), Bifulco and Ladd (2006), and 
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002). 
24
 See for example Fiske and Ladd (2000). 
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Table 4.1—Descriptive Statistics for Charter and Public Students 
  
 
Students only 
observed in 
public schools 
Students 
observed in 
charter schools 
for at least one 
year 
Students 
observed first in 
public school 
and then in 
charter school 
Number of students 3,870,804 38,668 21,239 
Percentage white 43.3 22.0 20.3 
Percentage African-American 14.4 37.5 35.7 
Percentage Hispanic 39.1 38.4 42.6 
Percentage Asian 0.7 0.4 0.4 
Average Math score in first year 
observed 
.003 -.406 -.370 
Average Reading score in first 
year observed 
.002 -.344 -.309 
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CHARTER SCHOOLS IN TEXAS 
 We examine charter schools in Texas through the 2003-04 school year, looking 
specifically at the students who move to a charter school during our data.  Table 4.1 shows 
average student characteristics for Texas students that we only observe in traditional public 
schools, that we observe for at least one year in a charter school, and that we observe first in 
traditional public school and then in a charter school.  Comparing the last two columns, we can 
see that students that we observe moving to charters during our data have similar average 
characteristics to the full set of students we observe in charter schools.  Also, out of 38,668 
students we observe in charter schools during our data, we observe 21,239 of them first in 
traditional public schools, so we see 55 percent of our charter students before they move to 
charter schools.  This is important, as these are the students for whom we can make comparisons 
between the charter school they move to and the traditional public school they left, as well as 
make inferences about what factors are associated with moving to a charter school. 
 Comparing the charter movers in the third column with the overall sample in the first 
column, students transferring to charter schools are more likely to be African-American, less 
likely to be white, and on average have lower standardized reading and math scores, relative to 
the general student population.  The students we observe transferring to a public school have 
slightly higher average math and reading scores than the full charter sample, but still 
significantly lower than for the statewide student average. 
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MODEL 
 We model a student’s likelihood of transferring to a charter school between grades 3 and 
8 as a function of the availability of charter schools, as well as student demographic and 
achievement characteristics that are associated with being more or less likely to attend a charter 
school.  Also included are campus and district characteristics for the campus and district the 
student is first observed in, as well as grade-by-year indicators for the first grade and year the 
student is observed in. 
 We model the charter transfer probability using a probit model as follows: 
(1) iidcici CMYXCAT νγβαφ +++++=  
where Ti is a binary variable that equals one if the ith student transfers to a charter school during 
our sample, CAc is a vector of charter availability measures for the cth campus in the last year 
that the student is observed, Xi is a vector of student characteristics, Yc is a vector of campus 
characteristics for the first campus we observe the student in, Md is a vector of district 
characteristics for the first district we observe the student in, Ci is a cohort indicator for the first 
grade and year we observe the student, and vi is the error term.  Students who are not observed in 
a traditional public school prior to being observed in a charter school are omitted from our 
analysis. 
 Note that this model can only predict the likelihood that a student will transfer to a 
charter school between grades 3 and 8, after being first observed in a traditional public school in 
at least grade 3.  If the factors influencing this decision are substantially different than the factors 
influencing the decision to go to a charter school in an earlier or later grade, or to start school in 
a charter without ever entering a traditional public school, then the predicted probability may not 
be representative of the overall charter school population. 
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DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The data set used in this chapter is a subset of the full student data set described in 
Chapter I, with data on Texas students in grades 3-8 from 1993-94 through 2003-04  All data 
were obtained from the Texas Education Agency.  The data include student math and reading 
test scores for every tested student in the state of Texas on the TAAS test (through 2001-02) or 
the TAKS test (2002-03 and 2003-04), both statewide standardized achievement tests.  The data 
also include student demographic indicators, including race/ethnicity, gender, free or reduced 
price lunch eligibility, limited English proficiency, special education status, whether the student 
is classified as At-risk.  The data include a unique student identifier, which we use to track 
individual students over time as they move between charter schools and traditional public 
schools.  We also have campus-level and district-level data sets with campus and district 
demographic data. 
 In order to estimate the probability that any student in our sample will transfer to a 
charter between grades 3 and 8, we construct a dataset that has one observation for each student 
observed in our data.  We omit students who were first observed in campuses that were more 
than thirty miles from the nearest charter school in the last year that the student was observed.  
We also omit students that were not in a public school in the first year that they were observed, 
and students in cohorts that would never have an opportunity to transfer to a charter school in 
our data (8th graders in 1995-96, 7th and 8th graders in 1994-95). 
 Because there is considerable variation between charter schools and traditional public 
schools in how students are classified as eligible for free or reduced price lunch, limited English 
proficient, special education, and At-risk, we use indicators for whether the student was ever in 
those categories, rather than indicators for whether they are in those categories in the first year 
they are observed. 
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 We also include in the model measures of charter school availability.  We use two 
different measures of charter availability.  The first is an indicator for the student being initially 
observed in a district that has at least one charter school by the last year the student is observed.  
The other is a set of indicators for there being a charter school within a 2.5, 5, or 10-mile radius 
of the public campus the student is first observed at, in the last year the student is observed. 
 Also included in the charter mover prediction model are indicators for the achievement 
quartile of the student in the first year they are observed, for math and reading.  These quartile 
indicators are constructed using standardized math and reading scores, and indicate the quartile 
of the student in the entire statewide student data, for that subject, grade, and year. 
 Because we are comparing test scores across different testing regimes with differently 
shaped student test score distributions, it is important to standardize the scores so that they are 
comparable over time.  We use rank-based Z-score to standardize the scores, which fit the 
statewide student score distributions onto a normal distribution by grade, year, and test, ensuring 
comparability over time and across different testing regimes. 
 Some of the results included in this chapter are extensions of the achievement models 
described in Chapter II, and of the charter competition models described in Chapter III.  For 
those models, see the original chapters for more detailed explanations of the models and the 
included variables. 
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Table 4.2—Summary Statistics for Chapter IV Estimation Sample 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Overall 
Sample 
Mean 
Mean for 
Students 
Observed 
Transferring 
to a Charter 
Number of students 2,613,054 21,715 
   
District has charter schools .393 .719 
At least one charter within 2.5 miles 
of public campus 
.260 .601 
At least one charter within 5 miles of 
public campus 
.481 .824 
At least one charter within 10 miles 
of public campus 
.730 .937 
   
Female .501 .492 
African-American .153 .391 
Hispanic .382 .415 
Ever FRL Eligible .556 .805 
Ever limited English proficient .181 .187 
Ever in special education .111 .147 
Ever classified as At-risk .541 .752 
   
Lowest initial reading quartile .272 .385 
Second initial reading quartile .245 .261 
Third initial reading quartile .237 .192 
Highest initial reading quartile .245 .162 
Lowest initial math quartile .266 .400 
Second initial math quartile .248 .257 
Third initial math quartile .245 .197 
Highest initial math quartile .242 .146 
   
Campus percent African-American .151 .282 
Campus percent Hispanic .388 .456 
Campus percent FRL eligible .511 .686 
Campus percent LEP .175 .226 
Campus percent special education .109 .101 
   
District percent African-American .154 .249 
District percent Hispanic .384 .449 
District percent FRL eligible .466 .586 
District percent LEP .144 .185 
District percent special education .113 .109 
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 Table 4.2 has the summary statistics for the student sample used in the probit regressions 
modeling the choice of students to transfer to a charter school.  The data set contains one 
observation per student in our data.  The first column has the means for the entire estimation 
sample, the second column only for students that we observe transferring to a charter school.  
Comparing the two columns, it is clear that students who transfer to charter schools are much 
more likely to be first observed in districts that have charter schools, and to be first observed in 
public schools that are within 2.5, 5, or 10 miles of a charter school.  Students who transfer to 
charter schools are also much more likely to be African-American, ever have been eligible for 
free or reduced price lunch, and to ever have been classified as At-risk, compared to the overall 
student sample. 
 Comparing the indicators for the initial student reading and math quartile, we can see 
that students who transfer to a charter school are more likely to be in the lowest initial 
achievement quartile in both reading and math, compared to the full student sample.  Charter 
movers also tend to come from campuses and districts with higher percentages of African-
American, Hispanic, FRL eligible, and LEP students.   
 
RESULTS 
 The aggregate statistics comparing students in charter schools with students in 
traditional public schools show that a higher percentage of charter school students are African-
American than in traditional public schools, and that a lower percentage of charter students are 
white than in traditional public schools.  However, this aggregate look does not tell us what is 
driving this differential.  One possibility is that charter schools locate in areas where the public 
schools have more African-American students than the state average, and that charter schools 
have demographics similar to surrounding public schools.  Another possibility is that African-
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American students are more likely to move to charter schools than white students, and this 
difference in preferences is driving the different demographics in charters and traditional public 
schools. 
 Additionally, raw averages across the state could mask interesting patterns that vary 
across student types.  Table 4.3 takes a closer look at the difference in the percent of students 
that are white, African-American, or Hispanic, comparing the percentages at the charter the 
student moves to with the percentages at the public school that student left.  In addition to 
looking at these differentials for all students that we observe moving from a traditional public 
school to a charter school, we also do these comparisons separately for white, African-American, 
and Hispanic students. 
The first column shows these comparisons for all students that we observe moving from 
a traditional public school to a charter school.  Here we can see that, although charter schools 
statewide have a lower percentage of white students than traditional public schools, when you 
compare the percent white at the public schools that students are leaving to go to charters it is 
actually lower than the percent white at the charter schools.  Similarly, while the percent black is 
higher in charter schools than at the public schools that these students leave (36.5 percent 
compared to 28.4 percent), the public schools that these charter movers are leaving have a higher 
percentage of black students than the state as a whole (13.9 percent). 
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Table 4.3—Comparing Traditional Public and Charter Peer Environments for Charter Movers by 
Race/Ethnic Background of Student 
  
Total 
 
White 
African-
American 
 
Hispanic 
Number of students 15,300 2,977 5,405 6,480 
     
Percent white in public 21.2 50.0 14.2 12.9 
Percent white in charter 22.7 56.0 12.0 15.1 
Difference 1.5 6.0 -2.2 2.2 
     
Percent African-American in public 28.4 15.7 52.7 14.1 
Percent African-American in charter 36.5 16.8 68.6 19.0 
Difference 8.1 1.1 15.9 4.9 
     
Percent Hispanic in public 47.8 30.5 30.8 71.1 
Percent Hispanic in charter 39.1 23.6 18.1 64.8 
Difference -8.7 -6.9 -12.7 -6.3 
     
Racial Herfindahl in public .605 .519 .567 .682 
Racial Herfindahl in charter .655 .570 .699 .662 
Difference .050 .051 .132 .020 
 
Notes: All differences are significant at the 5% level unless noted otherwise.  The public percentages are 
for the public school the student attended prior to moving to a charter. 
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The last lines of the table show the difference in the racial Herfindahl index, which is the 
product of the different racial percentages at the campus.25  For students overall, the racial 
Herfindahl is .655 at the charter school the student moves to, and .605 at the public school they 
left, meaning that on average charter movers are moving to charter schools that are more racially 
concentrated than the public schools they leave. 
More informative are the last three columns of Table 4.3, which make the same 
comparisons separately for white, African-American, and Hispanic students.  The first obvious 
difference is that each group attends both charter schools and traditional public schools that are 
more like them than the state averages.  White students who transfer to charters leave schools 
that are on average 50.0 percent white and go to charters that are on average 56.0 percent white.  
African-American students leave public schools that are on average 52.7 percent black and go to 
charters that are on average 68.6 percent black, a difference of almost 16 percentage points.  
Only Hispanic students transfer to charter schools with a lower average percentage of Hispanic 
students than the public schools they left, 64.8 percent compared to 71.1 percent, which is not 
surprising considering that the public schools the charter students are leaving are already so 
predominantly Hispanic. 
Those racial percentage differences imply that for white students, and especially for 
African-American students, the charter movers are moving to charter schools that are more 
racially segregated than the public schools they left.  The comparisons of racial Herfindahls bear 
this out, with white students on average going to charters with .050 higher Herfindahls than the 
traditional public school that they left, and African-American students going to charters with 
.132 higher Herfindahls on average. 
                                                                
25
 The racial Herfindahl is a measure of the degree of segregation at the campus.  A Herfindahl of 1 would be perfectly 
segregated, the lower the Herfindahl the less segregated the school is. 
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Table 4.4 compares average math and reading scores for students who transfer to charter 
schools with the average scores in the public schools they leave.  The first table shows the 
comparison for all charter movers.  The scores are standardized so that the state average score is 
equal to zero, but for both math and reading the average score at the public schools that charters 
are leaving is much lower, -.248 for math and -.232 for reading.  However, the average score of 
the charter movers is even lower, -.478 in math and -.392 in reading.  On average, charter 
schools are attracting students from public schools with lower average scores than the state as a 
whole, and they are attracting the lowest performing student from those campuses. 
 In the last three columns of the table we make the same comparisons separately for 
white, African-American, and Hispanic students.  Here the more interesting comparison is the 
difference between the score of the charter mover and the average score of students with the 
same race as the mover at the public school that they left.  This difference is negative for all 
three racial categories in both reading and math, but in both subjects the difference is largest for 
African-American students (-.279 difference in math scores, -.223 difference in reading scores), 
and lowest for Hispanic students.  That isn’t to imply that the African-American students at the 
public schools the African-American charter movers leave were doing well, in fact they had very 
low average scores (-.529 in math, -.392 in reading), but the African-American charter movers 
have even lower average scores (-.808 in math, -.615 in reading), so the difference is still large 
and negative. 
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Table 4.4—Comparing Average Math and Reading Scores of Charter Movers to Other Students 
at the Public Schools That They Leave 
  
Total 
 
White 
African-
American 
 
Hispanic 
Number of students 18,351 3,810 6,474 7,560 
     
Prior Math score of movers -.478 -.028 -.808 -.438 
Prior Math score of public peers -.248 .025 -.380 -.281 
Difference with public peers -.230 -.053 -.428 -.157 
     
Prior Math score of public peers of same 
race/ethnicity as mover 
- .191 -.529 -.312 
Difference with public peers of same 
race/ethnicity 
- -.219 -.279 -.126 
     
Prior Reading score of movers -.392 .104 -.615 -.463 
Prior Reading score of public peers -.232 .065 -.312 -.337 
Difference with public peers -.160 .039 -.303 -.126 
     
Prior Reading score of public peers of 
same race/ethnicity as mover 
- .248 -.392 -.380 
Difference with public peers of same 
race/ethnicity 
- -.144 -.223 -.083 
 
Notes: All differences are significant at the 5% level unless noted otherwise.  The public averages are for 
the public school the student attended prior to moving to a charter, but for the year after the student 
moved. 
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Table 4.5—Probit Regressions for Predicted Probability That a Student Will Move to a Charter 
 
 
Variable 
 
All 
Students 
African 
American 
Students 
 
Hispanic 
Students 
 
Other 
Students 
Public campus has a charter school within a 2.5-mile radius .223 
(.007) 
.156 
(.012) 
.291 
(.271) 
.129 
(.014) 
Public campus has a charter school within a 5-mile radius .125 
(.009) 
.089 
(.018) 
.108 
(.016) 
.153 
(.015) 
Public campus has a charter school within a 10-mile radius .142 
(.012) 
.208 
(.029) 
.142 
(.022) 
.148 
(.017) 
Public geographic district has at least one charter school .158 
(.007) 
.075 
(.014) 
.194 
(.011) 
.154 
(.013) 
     
Student is African-American .109 
(.010) 
- - - 
Student is Hispanic -.056 
(.009) 
- - - 
Student is Female -.013 
(.005) 
-.025 
(.010) 
-.024 
(.008) 
.017 
(.010) 
Student is ever FRL eligible .179 
(.008) 
.173 
(.015) 
.179 
(.017) 
.190 
(.012) 
Student is ever limited English proficient -.190 
(.009) 
-.330 
(.067) 
-.163 
(.010) 
-.337 
(.033) 
Student is ever in special education .088 
(.008) 
.054 
(.015) 
.106 
(.013) 
.102 
(.014) 
Student is ever classified as At-risk .206 
(.007) 
.231 
(.013) 
.204 
(.013) 
.220 
(.012) 
     
Student’s initial Reading score is in the lowest quartile -.042 
(.010) 
-.031 
(.020) 
-.045 
(.017) 
-.068 
(.019) 
Student’s initial Reading score is in the second quartile -.041 
(.009) 
-.049 
(.019) 
-.031 
(.016) 
-.048 
(.016) 
Student’s initial Reading score is in the third quartile -.023 
(.009) 
-.013 
(.019) 
-.032 
(.016) 
-.021 
(.014) 
Student’s initial Math score is in the lowest quartile .088 
(.010) 
.115 
(.021) 
.069 
(.016) 
.044 
(.019) 
Student’s initial Math score is in the second quartile .048 
(.009) 
.060 
(.020) 
.044 
(.015) 
.029 
(.016) 
Student’s initial Math score is in the third quartile .035 
(.009) 
.041 
(.020) 
.029 
(.015) 
.033 
(.014) 
     
Public campus percent LEP -.248 
(.034) 
.054 
(.081) 
-.243 
(.044) 
-.473 
(.093) 
Public campus percent FRL eligible .180 
(.032) 
-.136 
(.050) 
.377 
(.057) 
.305 
(.060) 
Public campus percent African-American -.016 
(.034) 
.335 
(.054) 
-.406 
(.066) 
.065 
(.068) 
Public campus percent Hispanic .097 
(.040) 
.188 
(.079) 
.210 
(.065) 
.028 
(.087) 
Public campus percent special education -.474 
(.092) 
-.335 
(.162) 
-.915 
(.155) 
.264 
(.169) 
     
Public district percent LEP .156 
(.055) 
-.224 
(.117) 
-.296 
(.078) 
1.12 
(.137) 
Public district percent FRL eligible -.100 
(.046) 
-.506 
(.084) 
-.272 
(.0780 
.172 
(.086) 
Public district percent African-American .578 
(.043) 
.627 
(.079) 
1.28 
(.079) 
.019 
(.080) 
Public district percent Hispanic .033 
(.050) 
.932 
(.100) 
.509 
(.084) 
-.471 
(.100) 
Public district percent special education .062 
(.160) 
-1.08 
(.331) 
.783 
(.271) 
-.579 
(.280) 
     
Number of observations 2,613,054 397,523 996,880 1,206,667 
 
Notes: Regressions contain one observation per student.  Indicators for the grade-by-year that the student 
is first observed are also included.  
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 We have seen the average characteristics of students who transfer to charter schools 
during our data, but we can also explicitly model which factors influence the decision to move to 
a charter school.  Earlier in this chapter we described a probit model for estimating the 
probability that a student will transfer to a charter school during the years and grades that we 
observe them, and those results are presented in Table 4.5.  The first column shows the results 
for the probit on the entire student sample, the remaining three columns show separate probit 
results for African-American, Hispanic, and other students. 
 The availability of charter schools plays an important role in determining who transfers 
to a charter.26  We include two different measures of charter availability.  The first is an indicator 
for the student being first observed in a district that has at least one charter school by the last 
year the student is observed.  The other is a set of indicators for the being a charter school within 
a 2.5, 5, or 10-mile radius of the public campus the student is first observed at, in the last year 
the student is observed.  As expected these effects are positive and significant.  There appears to 
be little difference in the effect of charter availability on the charter transfer decision when the 
probit is run separately for African-American, Hispanic, and other students. 
 As expected, African-American students have a higher probability of transferring to 
charters than other students.  However, Hispanic students actually have a lower probability of 
transferring to a charter than white students, once the other factors are controlled for.  Students 
who were ever free or reduced price lunch eligible, in special education, or classified as At-risk 
are also more likely to transfer to a charter, while students who were ever classified as limited 
English proficient are less likely to transfer to a charter. 
 Student who are low performing in math in the first year we observe them are more 
likely to transfer to a charter, as measured by indicators for the performance quartile of the 
                                                                
26
 Students who are first observed at a public campus that is more than thirty miles from a charter school in the last 
year we observe the student are omitted from the probit sample. 
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student.  Once the effect of math scores and being ever classified as At-risk are accounted for, 
students with low reading scores actually have a slightly lower chance of transferring to a charter 
school. 
 We showed earlier that African-American students who transfer to a charter school are 
likely to transfer to charter schools with a significantly higher percentage of African-American 
students than the public schools that they left.  In Chapter II we looked at the effects of attending 
a charter school on student test score gains, allowing the charter school effect to vary for 
African-American, Hispanic, and other students.  Those results are in Table 2.9, and they show 
that the effect of attending a charter school is the most positive for African-American students, 
and least positive for non-African-American, non-Hispanic students.  In Table 4.6A we extend 
this analysis to see if African-American students who transfer to charter schools with at least ten 
percentage points more African-American students than the public school that they left do better 
or worse in charter schools than those that go to charter schools with the same percent of 
students that are African-American (within ten percentage points either way), or than those that 
go to charter schools with more than ten percentage points fewer African-American students 
than the public school that they left. 
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Table 4.6A—Charter Attendance Effects, Effect Varies by the Percent African-American at the 
Charter School, Relative to the Public School the Student Left 
  
All Students 
African-American 
Students 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
1st year charter, higher percent 
African-American than public 
.003 
(.064) 
-.027 
(.057) 
-.123 
(.088) 
-.096 
(.078) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, higher percent 
African-American than public 
.164 
(.045) 
.096 
(.036) 
.104 
(.070) 
.051 
(.052) 
4th through 8th year charter, higher 
percent African-American than public 
.134 
(.049) 
.094 
(.042) 
.164 
(.044) 
.117 
(.036) 
1st year charter, same percent African-
American as public 
.008 
(.065) 
.038 
(.041) 
-.101 
(.104) 
-.002 
(.087) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, same percent 
African-American as public 
.072 
(.043) 
.056 
(.031) 
.149 
(.070) 
.095 
(.055) 
4th through 8th year charter, same 
percent African-American as public 
-.006 
(.035) 
.026 
(.026) 
.042 
(.071) 
.120 
(.051) 
1st year charter, lower percent 
African-American than public 
-.115 
(.070) 
.018 
(.060) 
-.157 
(.123) 
-.054 
(.108) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, lower percent 
African-American than public 
.024 
(.057) 
.014 
(.040) 
.041 
(.074) 
.070 
(.058) 
4th through 8th year charter, lower 
percent African-American than public 
-.090 
(.054) 
.014 
(.038) 
-.044 
(.082) 
.035 
(.054) 
     
District mover 
 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
-.057 
(.012) 
-.049 
(.012) 
Campus mover 
 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
-.183 
(.010) 
-.134 
(.009) 
Moved to charter from public -.249 
(.042) 
-.190 
(.029) 
-.216 
(.059) 
-.194 
(.039) 
Moved to public from charter .235 
(.020) 
.166 
(.017) 
.197 
(.029) 
.169 
(.025) 
Moved from one charter to another -.071 
(.058) 
-.023 
(.045) 
-.074 
(.080) 
-.043 
(.062) 
     
Sample size 1,254,704 1,246,878 195,230 193,696 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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Table 4.6B—Charter Attendance Effects, Effect Varies by the Percent Hispanic at the Charter 
School, Relative to the Public School the Student Left 
 All Students Hispanic Students 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
1st year charter, higher percent 
Hispanic than public 
-.107 
(.073) 
.024 
(.063) 
-.114 
(.098) 
.061 
(.063) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, higher percent 
Hispanic than public 
.062 
(.065) 
.036 
(.044) 
.050 
(.083) 
.002 
(.060) 
4th through 8th year charter, higher 
percent Hispanic than public 
-.078 
(.049) 
.010 
(.038) 
-.137 
(.066) 
-.011 
(.052) 
1st year charter, same percent 
Hispanic as public 
.003 
(.065) 
.050 
(.044) 
.076 
(.109) 
.138 
(.059) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, same percent 
Hispanic as public 
.077 
(.038) 
.064 
(.028) 
.046 
(.056) 
.027 
(.040) 
4th through 8th year charter, same 
percent Hispanic as public 
.018 
(.036) 
.037 
(.027) 
-.028 
(.055) 
-.017 
(.039) 
1st year charter, lower percent 
Hispanic than public 
.005 
(.065) 
-.060 
(.055) 
-.028 
(.101) 
-.092 
(.064) 
2nd or 3rd year charter, lower percent 
Hispanic than public 
.130 
(.044) 
.070 
(.036) 
.097 
(.063) 
.068 
(.048) 
4th through 8th year charter, lower 
percent Hispanic than public 
.100 
(.047) 
.080 
(.040) 
.001 
(.076) 
-.015 
(.063) 
     
District mover 
 
-.038 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.005) 
-.056 
(.008) 
-.030 
(.008) 
Campus mover 
 
-.148 
(.005) 
-.105 
(.004) 
-.171 
(.008) 
-.123 
(.006) 
Moved to charter from public -.245 
(.041) 
-.188 
(.029) 
-.225 
(.064) 
-.175 
(.046) 
Moved to public from charter .235 
(.020) 
.166 
(.017) 
.186 
(.036) 
.114 
(.028) 
Moved from one charter to another -.071 
(.058) 
-.022 
(.045) 
-.079 
(.105) 
-.048 
(.084) 
     
Sample size 1,254,704 1,246,878 465,220 461,669 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, an indicator for the student being in special education, and campus percent 
African-American and percent Hispanic. 
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 The first two columns are run for all students, math and reading, and the last two 
columns are run including only African-American students in the regression sample.  For the 
overall sample, the effect of being in a charter school in its fourth or higher year of operation on 
test score gains is highest for students moving to charter schools with at least ten percentage 
points more African-American students than the public school they left, with a coefficient of 
.134 in math and .094 in reading.  This effect holds for African-American students as well, with 
the largest positive charter effect on the African-American students that transfer to charter 
schools with at least ten percentage points more African-American students than the traditional 
public schools they left, and smaller charter attendance effects for other African-American 
students. 
 Table 4.6B does the same analysis for Hispanic students, looking at the effect of 
transferring to a charter school with more, about the same, or fewer Hispanic student than the 
traditional public school they left.  Here we find the opposite effect from Table 4.6A.  Both for 
the full sample and for Hispanic students only, the lowest charter school effects are for students 
who transfer to charter schools with at least ten percentage points more Hispanic students than 
the public school they left.  For Hispanic students, even those students in charter schools with at 
least four years in operation have large negative effects in both math and reading at charter 
schools with more Hispanic students than the public school that they left. 
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Table 4.7—Charter Competition Effect, Measured by Campus Average Student Probability of 
Moving to a Charter 
Variable Math Reading 
Campus average student predicted 
probability of moving to a charter 
6.42 
(2.69) 
5.40 
(2.32) 
   
Number of observations 831,826 825,396 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, student mover variables, and an indicator for the student being in special 
education. 
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 Next, we generate for each student in the probit regression sample a predicted 
probability of transferring to a charter school during our data, and use this information to extend 
the analysis of the effect of charter competition from Charter 3.  The first extension is in Table 
4.7.  Here we generate for each public campus the average predicted probability of the students 
at that campus transferring to a charter school.  Because this average predicted probability 
includes information on the availability of charter schools, it can serve as a proxy for the degree 
of competition the campus faces from charter schools.  This measure of charter competition also 
has the advantage of taking into account other student and campus characteristics that are 
associated with a student being more or less likely to move to a charter. 
 Table 4.7 shows the effect on math and reading when we use the campus average 
predicted probability of moving to a charter as an alternative charter competition measure in the 
campus-student spell fixed effect framework from Chapter III.  Both math and reading show a 
large positive effect from this measure of charter competition, with a math coefficient of 6.42 
and a reading coefficient of 5.40.  A high average predicted probability for a campus would be 
around .01, so this would imply that a campus with an average predicted probability of .01 
would have average math gains of .064 higher than a campus with a zero average predicted 
probability of moving to a charter, and average reading gains that are .054 higher, a fairly 
substantial effect. 
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Table 4.8—Charter Competition Effect, With Different Effects for Students With High or Low 
Probabilities of Moving to a Charter 
  
 
District-level competition 
Campus-level 
competition (# of charters 
within an N-mile radius) 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
District geographic charter percent, high 
probability student 
4.41 
(1.28) 
3.89 
(1.05) 
- - 
District geographic charter percent, low 
probability student 
1.85 
(1.03) 
.604 
(.904) 
- - 
# of charters within five miles of public 
campus, high probability student 
- - .015 
(.006) 
.019 
(.006) 
# of charters within five miles of public 
campus, low probability student 
- - .014 
(.009) 
.007 
(.009) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of public 
campus, high probability student 
- - .023 
(.004) 
.020 
(.004) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of public 
campus, low probability student 
- - -.002 
(.005) 
-.002 
(.005) 
     
Sample size 987,350 984,596 882,033 879,673 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, student mover variables, and an indicator for the student being in special 
education. 
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 Table 4.8 goes back to the baseline district-level and campus-level charter competition 
measures from Chapter III, but allows the effect of charter competition to vary depending on 
whether the student has a high (greater than .01) or low predicted probability of moving to a 
charter during our data.  The charter competition effect is much greater for students with a high 
predicted probability of moving to a charter, with district-level competition coefficients of 4.41 
in math and 3.89 in reading, compared to 1.85 in math and .60 in reading for students with a low 
predicted probability of moving to a charter.  A similarly large gap holds for the campus-level 
competition effect as well.  This provides support for the theory that schools respond to charter 
competition by focusing their resources primarily on improving the performance of those 
students that are most likely to leave for a charter school. 
 Finally, in Table 4.9 we do a similar analysis, but instead of allowing the charter 
competition effect to vary with the student’s predicted probability of moving to a charter school, 
we allow the charter competition effect to vary depending on the campus average predicted 
student probability of moving to a charter school, with a high average campus being one where 
the campus average predicted probability is more than .01.  Here we find a much smaller effect, 
with a slightly larger district-level competition effect on math and reading, and basically no 
difference in the campus-level competition specification.  This would indicate that there is little 
evidence of districts responding to charter competition by allocating resources towards campuses 
that appear more likely to lose students to charter schools. 
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Table 4.9—Charter Competition Effect, With Different Effects for Campuses With High or Low 
Average Student Probability of Moving to a Charter 
  
 
District-level competition 
Campus-level 
competition (# of charters 
within an N-mile radius) 
Variable Math Reading Math Reading 
District geographic charter percent, high 
average probability campus 
4.23 
(1.28) 
3.44 
(1.00) 
- - 
District geographic charter percent, low 
average probability campus 
3.01 
(1.17) 
2.88 
(1.00) 
- - 
# of charters within five miles of public 
campus, high average probability campus 
- - .016 
(.007) 
.018 
(.006) 
# of charters within five miles of public 
campus, low average probability campus 
- - .018 
(.007) 
.020 
(.007) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of public 
campus, high average probability campus 
- - .017 
(.005) 
.015 
(.004) 
# of charters within 6-10 miles of public 
campus, low average probability campus 
- - .009 
(.005) 
.009 
(.004) 
     
Sample size 831,826 825,396 725,411 719,836 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school clustering, in parenthesis.  Regressions also 
include grade-by-year effects, student mover variables, and an indicator for the student being in special 
education. 
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SUMMARY 
 We find that there are significant differences between those students who choose to 
transfer to a charter school and those that remain in traditional public schools, and that those 
differences vary by the race/ethnicity of the student.  African-American students in particular 
move to charter schools that have on average a much higher percentage of African-American 
students than the traditional public schools that they leave, and both white and African-American 
charter movers move to charter schools that are on average more racially concentrated than the 
public schools they left.  Charter schools appear to be taking students from primarily low 
performing campuses, and taking the lowest performing students from those campuses, with the 
differential being the largest for African-American charter students. 
 We model the individual student’s probability of transferring to a charter school and find 
logical relationships between charter availability, student demographic characteristics and initial 
achievement levels, and the probability of transferring to a charter.  We also revisit the 
framework for estimating the competitive effects of charter schools in Chapter III, and find that 
the charter competitive effects are more positive for students with a high predicted probability of 
leaving for a charter school, indicating that traditional public schools may respond to charter 
competition by focusing on improving the achievement gains of students that appear more likely 
to leave for a charter school. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
 In Chapter II, we examined the effect of attending a charter school on student 
achievement.  We find four primary results.  First, we find that students who enter charter 
schools tend to have lower scores in both reading and math during their first year in the charter 
school, and that this negative first-year charter student effect is consistent across different 
vintages of charter.  This result is consistent with the findings in Booker et al. (2004a). 
Second, we find that once you control for the negative first-year student effect, new 
charter schools tend to have student math and reading achievement gains comparable to those in 
traditional public schools.  We also find that the performance of charter schools tends to improve 
as the schools are in operation for additional years, and that charter schools that have been in 
operation for more than one year tend to perform better than traditional public schools, once the 
negative first-year charter student effect is accounted for.  Although most research has found that 
charter schools improve as they become more experienced, the results have been mixed on 
whether experienced charter schools outperform traditional public schools.  The total charter 
school effect is a combination of the first-year charter student effect and the overall charter effect 
by years of operation, and it does not appear that overall well-established charters are performing 
significantly better than traditional public schools. 
Third, we find that students who stay in a charter for two or more years generally have 
slightly lower average math and reading score growth than they would have had in a traditional 
public school.  This finding is different from that in Booker et al., which found that students that 
stayed in charter schools caught back up to where they would have been in traditional public 
school by the end of the second year in reading, and by the end of the third year in math.  
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However, the total difference in average effects is relatively small, the effect is just slightly more 
negative in this more recent work. 
Finally, we find that African-American students on average have higher performance 
gains than other student groups in charter schools that have been in operation for at least one 
year, and that non-African-American, non-Hispanic students have the poorest performance in 
these charter schools.  This finding is the opposite of what Bifulco and Ladd (2006) found in 
North Carolina, where African-American charter students had the lowest performance of all 
charter student groups. 
Overall, the two findings that are consistent in the literature on charter achievement are 
that charter school performance improves as the charters have been operation longer, and that 
charter students perform poorly in their first year in a charter school, and our findings reinforce 
both of those conclusions.  Most of the findings in the literature comparing average performance 
across the two sectors find either small differences or no difference, and our results basically 
concur.  This is unsurprising, as both sectors will have both high-performing schools and low-
performing schools, and given the large variation in charter institutional environments across 
states there is no reason to expect that the charter school achievement effect would be identical 
across all states. 
In Chapter III, we examined the effect of charter schools on student achievement in 
surrounding public schools, which can be characterized as the charter competition effect.  Our 
primary result here is that there is a relatively small but consistently positive effect of charter 
competition on math and reading score gains in surrounding public schools.  This positive 
competitive effect is consistent whether the competition is measured at the district-level by 
percentage of students in charters, or at the campus-level using charter penetration within a five 
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or ten-mile radius of the public campus.  The results are also robust to several different 
specifications. 
The existing literature on the competitive effects of charter schools is mixed, with 
Bifulco and Ladd (2006) finding no evidence of competitive effects in North Carolina, and Sass 
(2006) and Booker et al. (2004b) finding positive competitive effects in Florida and Texas, 
respectively.  Our results fall in the second group, and they are consistent enough that even if 
one doesn’t believe that the effect is necessarily a competitive response by traditional public 
schools, it is still clear that something is leading to higher test score growth in public schools that 
have nearby charter schools, whether it is a competitive effect, positive peer effects associated 
with losing low-performing students to charters, or some other related effect. 
We also find a couple of interesting results when examining which students have the 
largest gains due to charter competition.  We find that the effects of charter competition are felt 
most strongly for African-American and Hispanic students, with effect sizes approximately 2.5 
times larger than those for other students in traditional public schools.  We also find that the 
positive effects of charter competition are completely felt by the by campuses in the bottom half 
of the initial average achievement distribution, and that campuses that were initially high-
performing demonstrate no effect from charter competition.  This second result is consistent with 
Booker et al.. 
In Chapter IV, we examined the effect of charter schools on the distribution of students, 
both by ability and by race/ethnicity, as well as examining which student, campus, and district 
characteristics are most associated with a student having a high probability of transferring to a 
charter school.  We have three primary findings in this section.  First, we find that African-
American students, and to a lesser degree white students, on average transfer to charter schools 
that have a significantly higher percentage of students with the same race/ethnicity as the mover, 
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and that are more racially segregated, relative to the traditional public school they left.  This is 
consistent with the North Carolina results from Bifulco and Ladd (2004). 
Second, we find that students who move to charter schools tend to leave traditional 
public schools with lower average math and reading scores than the state as a whole.  
Additionally, the charter movers are not only low-performing relative to the other students at the 
public school they left, but have low average test scores even compared to the average scores of 
the other students of the same race/ethnicity at the public school they left.  These test score 
differences are smallest for Hispanic students and largest for African-American students.  This is 
likely due at least in part to the way the Texas charter law was structured to encourage charter 
schools to focus primarily on students that were At-risk, who on average have much lower test 
scores than other students. 
Third, we find that if we predict the probability of each student we first observe in a 
traditional public school transferring to a charter school between grades 3 and 8, then average 
this predicted student probability up to the campus level and use it as a measure of charter 
competition using the models from Chapter III, we find that again charter competition using this 
alternative measure has a positive and significant effect on student math and reading gains.  
Additionally, when we use our original measures of charter competition, but allow the 
competitive effect to vary depending on whether the traditional public student is estimated to 
have a high or low probability of ever moving to a charter, we find that the competitive effects 
are much stronger on those students who appear likely to leave for a charter school, relative to 
students with low predicted probabilities of leaving for a charter.  This is evidence that 
traditional public schools may be reallocating resources towards improving the performance of 
students that appear more likely to leave for charter schools. 
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Overall, this dissertation makes several important contributions to extending our 
understanding of the different effects that charter schools have in Texas, both on the students 
attending them and on students in traditional public schools. As more high-quality charter school 
studies become available in other states, as well as additional research in Texas, hopefully we 
can start to capture more fully what factors, both institutional, organizational, and instructional, 
lead to different effects of charter schools. 
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